

A Particle on the Edge: A Semantic/Syntactic Analysis of Russian *хоть*

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ABSTRACT

Maya Jerome Bringe: A Particle on the Edge: A Semantic/Syntactic Analysis of Russian *хоть*
(Under the direction of Dr. Laura A. Janda)

Russian *хоть* is a colloquial particle whose exact function is difficult to determine.

Хоть can be translated as ‘at least’, ‘even’, ‘although’, ‘for example’, ‘as much as’ and others, depending on the context. The particle demonstrates unusual semantic and syntactic properties that conventional approaches are unable to fully explain.

Viewing *хоть* as having a symbolic role that combines its syntactic and semantic features allows a more unified picture. The particle identifies a situation as marginal to a construed prototype in a speaker’s mental space. This role operates within four general contexts: An axiological context, a context of knowledge and perception, a context of logical possibility, and an exemplary context. This symbolic role gives a unified meaning of the particle – an indicator of a marginal situation with respect to a construed norm. It is this symbolic approach that gives the most insight into a speaker’s use of the word.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The Russian particle *хоть* is a colloquial particle whose general function in an utterance is difficult to determine. *Хоть* can be translated as ‘at least’, ‘even’, ‘although’, ‘for example’, ‘as much as’ and others, depending on the context. *Хоть* also appears in the set phrases *хоть отбавляй* [ХОТЬ pour off-imper] ‘to saturation’ or ‘up to one’s eyeballs’ and *хоть убей* [ХОТЬ kill-imper] ‘for the life of me’ or ‘to a fault’. Previous authors note that *хоть* does not appear alone and its meaning must be determined in context. A few examples of the particle demonstrate that it has a considerable semantic range:

- (1) Могу я, наконец, **хоть** раз в жизни выпить спокойно!
[Can-np I-N, finally, ХОТЬ time-A in life-L drink-np-infin peacefully!]
‘Can I, finally, **just** one time in my life have a drink in peace!’
(from my data set, Appendix 1, Example 5)
- (2) Работы у него **хоть отбавляй**!
[Work-G near he-G ХОТЬ diminish-imper]
He’s **up to his eyes** in work!
(from Wade 1992)
- (3) Ну, какой упрямый!! **Хоть** как его убеждай – ни за что от своего не откажется.
[Well, how-N stubborn-N!! ХОТЬ how he-A try to convince-imper – not for what-A from own-G not turn away-np.]
‘Oh, how stubborn he is!! **No matter how hard** you try to convince him, he’ll never change his mind.’
(from Vasilyeva 2002)

There currently exists no formulation of a satisfying overall meaning for the word. Despite the many functions proposed for *хоть*, I contend that it performs a single function in these sentences. The goal of this thesis is to explain the role of the particle *хоть* in a sentence, namely that it identifies a situation as marginal within the mental space of the speaker.

This work will treat only the word *хоть*. In Chapter I, we will note that Vasilyeva and Zel'dovič claim that there is little or no semantic difference between *хоть* and *хотя бы*. In contrast, Nikolaeva & Fužeron argue that *хоть* and *хотя бы* may have different etymological roots. Although it seems unlikely that speakers are aware of any historical difference between *хоть* and *хотя бы*, the task of sorting out any semantic differences in a continuous semantic range between these two goes beyond the scope of this thesis. I have chosen to restrict my discussion to only the form *хоть*, while noting that other forms are considered synonymous by some authors.

Chapter II will be a discussion of current approaches to *хоть*. Because the particle is so colloquial, it is often overlooked in traditional grammars and is rarely addressed in theoretical linguistic literature. I will examine the works of authors who do address the particle *хоть*. These scholars have tended to treat the particle descriptively, enumerating various meanings of *хоть* or detailing contexts in which it might appear. Wade (1992) and Vasilyeva (2002) enumerate functions that *хоть* performs in a sentence, while Zel'dovič (1991) enumerates the contexts that may contribute to the meaning of *хоть*. We will see that some authors – like Lobanova & Slesareva (1980) focus on the syntactic context for *хоть*, while Nikolaeva & Fužeron (1999) present arguments about its historical evolution. None of these lead to a unified description of the role of *хоть* in a sentence. However, we will see

that *хоть* has a syntactic property not shared by other particles, namely that a negative particle is not required for *хоть* to render a negative meaning. This fact, along with Nikolaeva & Fužeron’s contention that *хоть* may be a historical imperative, suggests that a unified meaning may be found in the syntactic role of *хоть*.

In Chapter III, I will discuss the syntax of *хоть* and note that this word is problematic for traditional syntactic approaches. It is difficult to assign *хоть* to a part of speech, which is why the term “particle” is often used to describe *хоть*. I will discuss that term and examine the possibility that *хоть* belongs in the grammatical category of clitic based on tests supplied by Zwicky (1977 and 1985) and a framework supplied by Klavans (1982). We will see that although such a categorization may be possible, it does not yield an understanding of the unified function of *хоть*.

In Chapter IV, I will propose the approach that I believe best addresses the complex nature of this particle: a construction grammar. In a construction grammar the semantic roles of the unit parts of a construction are inseparable from the syntactic roles. This approach will suggest that *хоть* has a symbolic role – based on the combination of semantic and syntactic roles – rather than a traditional referential meaning. With this unified role in mind, I will address the symbolic role of *хоть* in Chapter VI.

Principles from the fields of cognitive science and cognitive linguistics will provide the approach that defines the function of *хоть*. Mental spaces and graded categories set up by speakers as frames of reference for utterances will serve as a context for the discussion of the symbolic role of *хоть* in an utterance. With this background I will propose a cognitive model for the role of *хоть* as suggested by the analysis of data collected from the *Национальный корпус русского языка* (The Russian National Corpus – www.ruscorpora.ru). We will see

that *xomb* serves to indicate that a situation is marginally included in the mental space of a speaker. This marginally included situation marks the most extreme possibility that might be included in that space. The *xomb*-construction serves two purposes at once: to note that the situation is marginal to a space, and to indicate where the edge of that space is in the mind of the speaker. In addition, I will discuss this model as it applies to the conjunctive use of *xomb* and how the negation of a *xomb*-construction fits into this model.

The conclusion that *xomb* cannot be separated from its attached constituent is not necessarily a new one, nor one that is dependent on a given framework. However, this thesis proposes a symbolic role for *xomb* – a combined semantic and syntactic role – that identifies a speaker’s categorization of a situation marked by *xomb* as marginal against a frame established within a discourse situation. I will note that a construction involving *xomb* appears in four different contexts. In axiological contexts, that is in those contexts concerned with positive evaluation, *xomb* indicates a situation that is marginally positively evaluated. In contexts of knowledge and perception, *xomb* indicates that an amount of knowledge or perception is minimal with respect to the knowledge a speaker expects or desires. In contexts of logical possibility, *xomb* marks a situation which the speaker considers a logical extreme – either minimal or maximal. In an exemplary context, *xomb* indicates that the highlighted situation represents an optimal example of a speaker’s point of view. Therefore, in each context, *xomb* serves as a symbolic marker of the marginality of a situation. It is this symbolic role that proves to be the unified meaning of the particle *xomb* – as an indicator of a marginal situation with respect to a construed norm – and therefore it is this approach that gives the most insight into a speaker’s use of the word.

CHAPTER II

Current Approaches

In this chapter I will examine the literature that addresses the Russian particle *хоть*. Authors who treat *хоть* take one of two approaches: Vasilyeva and Wade offer different meanings for *хоть*, while Zel'dovič focuses on one function of *хоть* and claims that the surrounding context determines the meaning of the particle. We will see that neither approach provides a satisfying, unified meaning for the particle.

Хоть is generally considered to be either a colloquial conversational particle or, in its conjunctive use, a colloquial or phonetically reduced variant of *хотя* ‘although’. Because the particle is colloquial, *хоть* is rarely treated in theoretical literature, except as a variant of the conjunction *хотя* ‘although’. Additionally, the particle is rarely addressed in standard grammars of Russian. The grammars that do treat *хоть* do so descriptively, offering a few functions of the particle and noting a few set phrases that include *хоть*. Despite the lack of theoretical commentary available, the categories that the authors carve out for *хоть* can be instructive, especially when compared with each other.

Wade (1992) offers the following four categories into which the particle’s uses may fall:

1. A minimum requirement or expectation:

(4) **Хоть** причешишь!

[ХОТЬ comb-hair-imper!]¹

‘**At least** comb your hair!’

¹Key for glosses is found at the beginning of Appendix 1. Translations are Wade’s, while glosses are mine.

2. An exemplary meaning:

(5) Взять **хоть** тебя; ты ведь ни разу не пожаловался.

[Take-imper ХОТЬ you-A; you-N EMPH not time-G not complain-p-s.]

‘Take you, **for example**; now you haven’t once complained.’

3. A readiness to oblige, or to indulge a whim:

(6) Поедем **хоть** завтра!

[Go-np-pl ХОТЬ tomorrow!]

‘Let’s go tomorrow, **for all I care!**’

4. Intensity of extreme manifestation (with imperatives):

(7) Работы у него **хоть отбавляй!**

[Work-G near he-G ХОТЬ diminish-imper!]

‘He’s **up to his eyes** in work!’

(Wade, 1998: 522)

Wade (1998: 510) acknowledges that particles “are parts of speech which impart additional semantic nuances to other words, phrases or sentences, in most cases having no independent meanings of their own”. Wade does not attempt to impose any theoretical coloring on his brief treatment. All of Wade’s examples show *хоть* appearing before the semantically and grammatically affected constituents.

In addition to the four categories listed above, Wade notes two other contexts in which *хоть* appears. In Russian particles tend to form aggregates “to heighten emphasis” (Wade 1992: 523). Wade (1992: 525) lists aggregates of *хоть* (and *хотя*) with the conditional particle *бы* as a fifth function of the particle *хоть* and gives the following examples:

5. In the aggregates with conditional *бы*

(8) **Хоть бы** кто-нибудь мимо прошёл... (Gagarin)

[ХОТЬ CONDIT who-INDEF-N past go-past-p-s...]

‘**If only** someone passed this way...’

(9) Она рада была бы любому попутчику, **хотя бы** технику Мишелю.
(Zalygin)

[She-N glad-N be-p-s CONDIT any-D fellow-traveler-D, ХОТЯ БЫ technician-D Michel-D.]

‘She would have been glad of any traveling companion, **even if** it was only the technician Michel.’

Finally, Wade (1992: 502) notes that *хоть* is a phonetic reduction of the concessive conjunction *хотя* ‘although’ – a sixth function for the particle:

6. As a concessive conjunction

(10) Федор **хоть** и начальник, но все-таки сосед. (Zhukhovitsky)

[Fedor-N ХОТЬ and boss-N, but all the same neighbor-N.]

‘**Although** Fedor is the boss, he is a neighbor just the same.’

Therefore, Wade outlines six separate functions for the particle *хоть*. *Хоть отбавляй* ‘to saturation’, the most common of the set phrases which feature the particle, is regarded as a case of “intensity of extreme manifestation” (Wade 1998: 522). His categories are:

1. A minimum requirement or expectation
2. An exemplary meaning
3. A readiness to oblige, or to indulge a whim
4. Intensity of extreme manifestation (with imperatives)
5. In an aggregate of particles (meaning unspecified)
6. A conjunction, reduced form of *хотя*

Vasilyeva (2002) also treats the particle *хоть* in a context-by-context manner. Her more specific work – a book about particles for students of Russian – gives a fuller treatment than Wade’s, although she distributes the particle into four broad functional categories as well: 1) to fulfill an expressive-emphatic function in an affirmation or negation implying an antithesis with something extreme (maximal or minimal), 2) to cite something as an example, 3) to express one’s satisfaction with something minimal, and 4) to express, with the particle *бы* and a verb in the subjunctive mood, an emotionally concessive negation or to stress a possibility that has not been exploited (Vasilyeva 2002: 155-9). In keeping with the nature of the book, she provides alternatives for near-synonymous particles in the categories when possible. Vasilyeva (2002: 155) states that “[t]he particle *хоть* (*хотя*) comes from the concessive conjunction *хотя*”. Unlike Wade, Vasilyeva (2002: 155) gives an overall meaning for the particle, one of “proportional emphasis”, noting however that “[t]his

meaning may alter in various contexts taking on new shades”. The functions Vasilyeva offers are sufficiently broad that I will discuss the diverse subcategories here as well.

The first of Vasilyeva’s four general contexts is described as follows: “In an affirmation or negation implying an antithesis with something extreme (maximal or minimal), the particle *хоть* fulfills an expressive emphatic function” (Vasilyeva 2002: 155-6). She notes that the emphatic phrases *даже* ‘even’ and *даже если* ‘even if’ are often synonymous with *хоть* in this context. While Wade considers *хотя бы* (*хоть бы*) only in terms of combinations of particles, Vasilyeva notes that these combinations often fulfill the same function as *хоть* alone. Her treatment of this category includes subcategories that are distinct enough to merit comment. The first of her examples is a case where *даже* ‘even’ and *даже если* ‘even if’ serve the same function. I will call this sub-type an affirmation of a minimum. In this case *хоть* affirms that to have survived one war is sufficient for an understanding of war’s horrors. Here Vasilyeva notes that *хоть бы* is also possible:

1a. An affirmation of a minimum

- (11) Кто из вас перенёс войны, **хоть (бы) (даже, даже если)** одну, тот знает, какие ужасы она несёт самым слабым.
[Who-N from you-G endure-p-s war-A, ХОТЬ one-A, that-N know-np-s, what-sort-of-A horror-A bring-np-s most-D weak-D.]
‘Those of you who have lived through wars, **even** one, know what horrors they spell for the weakest.’
(Vasilyeva 2002: 156)²

The other shades of meaning in this category, however do not share all the attributes of the first. Vasilyeva (2002: 156) identifies a second subcategory, which uses the particle to “build statements in the nature of a concession, implying a challenge”. Here *даже* ‘even’ and *даже если* ‘even’ are near-synonyms (along with *нужно* ‘let’ and *ну* ‘well’). She gives this example for the subcategory:

²As with Wade’s examples, all translations are Vasilyeva’s unless noted; all glosses are mine.

1b. Statement with a concession, implying a challenge

(12) Он ведь ругается не по злобе, а так, по привычке...

[He-N EMPH swear-np-s not along spite-D, and so, along habit-D...]

‘He swears not because he’s cross, but just out of habit...’

Хоть по привычке! Это его не оправдывает.

[ХОТЬ along habit-D! That he-A not absolve-np-s.]

‘**Even so!** That’s no excuse.’

Vasilyeva (2002: 157) offers a third function in this category – a meaning of “hyperbolic antithesis” – which “may convey annoyance, despair, approval, admiration, etc”. Vasilyeva (2002: 157) notes that “[i]n such cases a construction containing the imperative of a verb is generally used”. Vasilyeva’s example:

1c. Hyperbolic antithesis

(13) Клуб у нас новый отстроили. Сцена – **хоть** весь балет из Большого театра ставь!

[Recreation center-M near we-G new-N build-p-pl – ХОТЬ all-N ballet- from Bolshoi-G theater-G put-impf!]

‘They’ve built a new cultural center in our area. The stage **is such that you could** put the whole ballet from the Bolshoi theater there.’³

(Vasilyeva 2002: 157)

Note that this overlaps with “intensity of extreme manifestation (with imperatives)” that Wade has given as his fourth function (see Fig 2.1 for comparison of the authors’ lists). Vasilyeva (2002: 157) suggests that *хоть* could be replaced with the “emphatic particle” *прямо* ‘frankly’ which she notes often accompanies *хоть* and has a “similar meaning”. *Прямо* ‘frankly’ is generally considered to be an adverb, and is not included in the list of particles treated in her book.

Vasilyeva’s next function is “emphatic agreement, statement, or categorical refusal” (2002: 156). Let us examine her first example:

³This translation is mine. Vasilyeva’s less literal translation reads: ‘They’ve built a new cultural center here. The stage is so enormous, it could even take the whole Bolshoi ballet.’

1d. Emphatic agreement or categorical refusal

(14) Останься у нас ещё на недельку.

[Stay-imper near we-G still on week-A.]

‘Do stay with us for another week.’

Хоть на день. Не могу. Уже телеграмму дал, что выезжаю.

[ХОТЬ on day-A. Not be-able-np-s. Already telegram-A give-p-s, that go-out-np-s.]

‘**Not even** for a day. I can’t. I’ve already wired I’m leaving.’

This is the response denoting categorical refusal. However, as an alternate response,

Vasilyeva provides:

(15) **Хоть** на две – охотно.

[ХОТЬ on two-A – willingly.]

‘**Even** for two – with pleasure.’

(Vasilyeva 2002: 156)

Хоть на день ‘not even for a day’ and *хоть на две* ‘even for two’ are syntactically identical structures, which nonetheless transmit opposite meanings – one categorically rules out a possibility and the other enthusiastically encompasses it. The listener can only judge which function the particle is performing based on the context of the exchange. When the answer is a refusal, the negative particle is not required, although it would be needed with any other particle (*даже* ‘even’, for example). In this way, *хоть* behaves strangely. The particle clearly plays a syntactic role that is more than emphatic. In *хоть на день* ‘not even for a day’ the particle indicates a negative response. In *хоть на две* ‘even for two’, the response is positive. There is no reason to suspect that the prepositional phrase carries the property that allows both interpretations. *Хоть* has a syntactic quality that makes both a negative and positive interpretation possible. While Vasilyeva often provides near-synonymous options in her work, there cannot be such an option in this example, because no other particle has the quality that it can give both a positive and negative reading. Therefore, Vasilyeva does not list a synonym for this function. Vasilyeva does not address the quality of

хоть that allows a negative and positive reading, but any attempt to classify or clarify *хоть* will have to treat this syntactic property. We will see in Chapter VI that the symbolic role that *хоть* plays in an utterance is responsible for this interpretation.

Vasilyeva's second meaning is the exemplary meaning that Wade also presents as his second. Vasilyeva (2002: 157) notes that the use of *хоть* "stresses the fact that the speaker has no difficulty in finding the example". She provides a range of near-synonyms, like *ну* 'well', *да* 'yes', 'and', and *вот* 'look', all of which have a slightly different shade of meaning.

Vasilyeva (2002: 158) also includes as a function in the exemplary category "phrases consisting of the particle *хоть* and a relative pronoun or adverb (*что* 'what', *кто* 'who', *куда* 'whither', etc.) [which] convey the meaning of 'unlimitedness' (*что угодно* 'whatever you please', *как хотите* 'however you want', *куда угодно* 'wherever you please')". Her example follows:

2b. *хоть* + relative pronoun, 'as much as you please'

(16) Ну, какой упрямый!! **Хоть** как его убеждай – ни за что от своего не откажется.

[Well, what-sort-of-N stubborn-N!! **XOTЬ** how he-A convince-imper – not for what-A from own-G not refuse-np-s.]

'Oh, how stubborn he is!! **No matter how hard** you try to convince him, he'll never change his mind.'

(Vasilyeva 2002: 158)

It is not clear why this meaning is deemed exemplary in Vasilyeva's assessment. This meaning seems to have more in common with Wade's "intensity of extreme manifestation" than it does with an exemplary function. Wade does not touch on the use of *хоть* and relative pronouns in his brief treatment, but it seems that this example is significantly different from an exemplary one.

Vasilyeva (2002: 158) describes the third meaning in the following way: “*Хоть* may express one’s satisfaction with something minimal, acceptance of something of modest quantity or quality, or contentment with merely a small amount of something”. A typical example follows:

3. Satisfaction with something minimal

- (17) Знаю, что занят, знаю. Я и не требую большого внимания. Спасибо, **ХОТЬ** не забываешь.
[Know-np-s, that busy-N, know-np-s. I-N and not demand-np-s big-G attention-G. Thank you, **ХОТЬ** not forget-np-s.]
‘I know that you’re busy, I know. And I’m not demanding much attention. Thank you **at least** for not forgetting.’⁴
(Vasilyeva 2002: 158)

This example echoes Wade’s “minimum requirement or expectation”. While it is clear that the speaker is acknowledging the listener’s “not forgetting” as satisfactory in a minimal fashion, another example in this category is less clear:

- (18) Ты можешь поехать туда?
[You-N be-able-np-s go-infin there?]
‘Can you go there?’
А когда надо ехать?
[And when necessary go-infin?]
‘And when must I go?’
Да **ХОТЬ** (**ХОТЯ БЫ**) завтра.
[And **ХОТЬ** tomorrow.]
‘Tomorrow, **for instance**.’
(Vasilyeva 2002: 158)

Not only is this example unclear without context (Is it a concession that he go tomorrow? Would it be better if he were sent today, and therefore tomorrow is the element that provides minimal satisfaction?), the exchange bears a remarkable syntactic resemblance to the example given in Wade’s category of “readiness to oblige, or to indulge a whim”. Both examples are of *хоть* + *завтра*, with few, if any, contextual clues to indicate a different

⁴This translation is my more literal one. Vasilyeva’s: ‘I know you’re busy. I know. But I’m not asking for much attention. Thanks at least for remembering.’

meaning. If context is what separates this example from Wade's *Поедем хоть завтра!* 'Let's go tomorrow for all I care!', then we might wonder if the categories are not as firmly delimited as the authors of grammars suggest. Perhaps these functions are manifestations of one or two unified meanings for which *хоть* is responsible, and if that is the case, perhaps we can say something more definitive about *хоть*'s meaning than citing Vasilyeva's "proportional emphasis".

Vasilyeva's (2002: 159) last category is "the particle *хоть* with the conditional particle *бы* or with a verb in the subjunctive mood...used to express an emotive-concessive negation or to stress a possibility which has not been exploited". Here, as in Wade's examples involving combinations of particles, it is possible to interpret *хоть* as either a particle or a conjunction:

4. With *бы*, an unexploited possibility

(19) Операцию ему делали без наркоза – нельзя было. Боль невозможная.

Хоть бы застонал!

[Operation-A he-D do-p-pl without anesthetic-G – impossible be-p-s. Pain-N impossible-N. ХОТЬ CONDIT groan-p-s!]

'He was operated on without an anesthetic – it was out of the question. The pain was unbearable. But he **didn't even** groan.'

(Vasilyeva 2002: 159)

Two things are striking about this example. First, because the constituent affected by *хоть* can be perceived as either a verbal phrase or as a whole clause, one could characterize *хоть* in this role either as a particle or a conjunction, and the meaning is unaffected by that characterization. The second notable point is that here again, no negative particle is necessary to express the fact that the patient did not groan. In contrast, Vasilyeva presents near-synonyms that require a negative particle to convey the same meaning. Her examples follow:

- (20) Ведь не застонал! ‘He didn’t even groan!’
 (21) Ну не застонал! ‘Well! He didn’t even groan!’
 (22) И не застонал! ‘He didn’t groan even once!’
 (23) Так не застонал! ‘But he didn’t groan!’

In example 19, the negative particle is not required because of a property of the particle *хоть*, but because the conditional particle *бы* indicates that the situation characterized is an unreal condition. In this way, this example differs from examples 13 and 14, in which the particle *хоть* itself appears to allow a negative and a positive interpretation.

While all of her examples have *хоть* before the portion of the sentence that *хоть* is attached to, Vasilyeva (2002: 160) maintains that “[x]о́ть is placed at the beginning of the sentence or immediately before or after the word it emphasizes”. Vasilyeva also adds that when the particle appears after the emphasized word, it is generally pronounced unstressed with a reduced vowel. Vasilyeva is the only author I encountered who makes this claim.⁵

Manuals of usage or syntax tend to focus on just one or two of the functions described by Wade and Vasilyeva. However, two authors focus on *хоть* in a particular syntactic construction. Lobanova & Slesareva (1980) discuss the combination of *хоть* with imperatives emphasizing the action denoted by the imperative as an extreme measure, something that would be done as a last resort. This function of *хоть* corresponds to Wade’s “intensity with imperatives” and Vasilyeva’s “hyperbolic antithesis”. Some examples:

- (24) Так далеко ездить в университет, **хоть** меняй квартиру.⁶
 [So far go-infin in university-A, XOTЬ change-imper apartment-A]
 ‘One has to go some far to get to the university, that **one should practically** change apartments.’⁷

⁵My data suggest that incidences of *хоть* appearing after the emphasized constituent are quite rare. There is one example (37) in my data set. Croft’s Radical Construction Grammar, the syntactic framework introduced in Chapter 4, holds that a construction does not specify the order of the elements (Croft 2001: 26). Therefore, the possibility of *хоть* appearing after a highlighted element will not affect my analysis.

⁶In Lobanova & Slesareva’s text on syntax, these examples are exercises for students of Russian focusing on uses of the imperative.

⁷The translations and glosses are mine.

(25) Никак не найдем такси. **Хоть** иди пешком.

[In no way not find-np-pl taxi-A. XOTЬ go-on-foot-imper on foot]

‘There is no way we will find a taxi. **We might as well** go on foot.’

(26) Такой сквозняк. Двери все время хлопают, **хоть** запирай их на ключ.

[Such-N draft-N Door-N all-A time-A slam-np-pl, XOTЬ lock up-imper they-A on key-A.]

‘Such a draft. The doors slam all the time; **you almost have to** lock them up with the key.’

(Examples: Lobanova & Slesareva 1980: 125-8)

The following figure (Fig.2.1) compares the functions described by Wade and Vasilyeva.

I have listed Vasilyeva’s more comprehensive categories first, and the colors are keyed to

those functions. The figure demonstrates that Wade and Vasilyeva cover the same semantic

ground – no author presents a function that is not covered by the other author’s treatment.


However, the figure also demonstrates that the authors have not identified identical

categories as the salient functions of *хоть*. The tendency of both authors’ categories to

overlap with one or more of the others’ indicates that the boundaries between the functions of

хоть are not clear-cut.

Vasilyeva:



Key: (based on Vasilyeva's categories) Lines demonstrate an overlap with:

- 1a. **An affirmation of a minimum**
- 1b. **A statement with concession, a challenge**
- 1c. **Hyperbolic antithesis**
- 1d. Emphatic agreement or refusal
- 2a. **Exemplary Function**
- 2b. *Хоть* + relative pronoun, 'as much as you please'
- 3. **Satisfaction with something minimal**
- 4. **With *бы*, unexploited possibility**

Fig. 2. 1: A Comparison of Functions of *хоть*: Wade and Vasilyeva

Zel'dovič (1991) addresses only the minimal meaning of *хоть*, referred to by Wade as “minimum requirement or expectation” and by Vasilyeva as “satisfaction with something minimal”. He notes that the minimal and maximal meanings are related and provides the following example to demonstrate both:

- (27) Пожалуйста, дайте мне **хоть** один карандаш.
[Please, give-imper I-Dsg ХОТЬ one-Asg pencil-Asg]
‘Please, give me **at least** one pencil.’
Да берите **хоть** все!
[Yes take-imper ХОТЬ all-Apl]
‘Sure, take **even** all of them’

The one pencil serves as the minimum with which the first speaker would be satisfied, and the maximal interpretation of the particle refers to all of the pencils. Zel'dovič also makes a distinction between the concessive conjunction *хоть* and the particle. He recognizes three particles as synonymous: *хоть*, *хотя бы*, and the obsolete *хотя*. His recognition of *хотя бы* as a form of the particle reinforces Vasilyeva's contention that it is a possible synonym for *хоть* in many contexts.

Zel'dovič places his emphasis not on the minimal function of the particle, but on how the meaning of that function is affected by different “modalities” or “modes/moods” (*модальности*) of the clause in which it appears – for example: axiological, alethic, deontic, ontological, etc. Despite different shades of meaning in different contexts, Zel'dovič asserts one overall function for *хоть*, which he notes has long been recognized to denote concession. Zel'dovič (1991: 112) characterizes a set of situations that allows the usage of *хоть*:

“[В] реальном или возможном мире существует ситуация P; можно было ожидать что P мешает осуществлению какой-то другой ситуации P₁. Кроме того, уступка часто предполагает, что P входит в некое множество ситуаций, влияющих на реализацию P₁”

(In a real or possible world, there exists a situation P; it can be expected that P in some way hinders/interferes with the fulfillment of some different situation P₁. In addition, concession often assumes that P is included in a certain set of situations, which have influence on P₁.)⁸

P is the situation in this range of situations that the presence of *хоть* denotes. Zel'dovič asserts that *хоть* is indicating the position of the affected constituent within the set of possibilities. He makes no direct claims about the syntactic relationship between *хоть* and the situation affected and I will use the term “highlight” to acknowledge a relationship between them without making claims about its syntactic nature.

Zel'dovič (1991: 112) asserts that the situations in the set with P are ordered “по характеру и силе этого влияния” (according to the character/nature and the strength of this influence) and that the situation P is not chosen at random. Some situations lie on the upper side of P, and some on the lower. However Zel'dovič notes the following about the situations below P on the scale:

“[о] последних нужно сказать, что они практически никогда не имеют положительного влияния на P₁, т.е. не могут быть просто «менее благоприятны, чем P», а являются неблагоприятными; если уступительное высказание утверждает приемлемость P, то все нижележащее, как правило, не приемлемо.” (Zel'dovič 1991: 112)

(About these last items, it must be noted that they practically never have a positive influence on P₁, that is they cannot be simply “less auspicious than P” but are inauspicious; if the concessive utterance asserts the acceptability of P, then everything which lies lower, as a rule, is not acceptable.)

Therefore, Zel'dovič conceives of the highlighted situation as “minimal” because anything less than that situation is not acceptable. He examines types of qualifications that rank situations as greater or lesser in terms of the “modalities” (модальности). Zel'dovič

⁸The translations of Russian citations are mine.

asserts that these contexts for *хоть* determine the meaning of the particle. He begins by examining simple non-modal sentences and proceeds to sentences with more complicated “modalities” (модальности). His non-modal example follows:

- (28) “Он **хоть бы** позвонил, а ты этого не сделал.”⁹
[He-Nsg ХОТЯ БЫ call-p,sg, and you-Nsg that-Gsg not do-p,sg]
‘He **at least** called, and you didn’t do that.’
(Zel’dovič 1991: 112)

Zel’dovič attempts in each context to ascribe to a situation a scalar axis along which *хоть* highlights the minimum acceptable point.

For example, in the axiological context, that is, a situation which deals with the evaluation of the speaker, Zel’dovič (1991: 113) devises a system of description for what the particle denotes, as follows:

Хоть сообщает, что а) Возможно нечто лучшее, чем Р. б) Возможно нечто худшее, чем Р. в) Можно было думать, что Р плохо или не очень хорошо, но, учитывая возможность худшего, говорящий оценивает Р положительно. (*Хоть* reports that а) there is the possibility of something better than Р, б) there is the possibility of something worse than Р, and в) Р could be thought of as bad or at least not good, but considering the possibility of something worse, the speaker is evaluating Р positively.)

Because Zel’dovič is trying to find a reason that the speaker is commenting on Р specifically, as opposed to another of the situations in the possible range, he arrives at the last of his conditions:

г) С точки зрения говорящего, Р более вероятно, чем лучшие возможности. ((d) From the point of view of the speaker, Р is more probable than the better possibilities.)
(Zel’dovič 1991: 113)

Zel’dovič’s last constraint of expectability presents a problem. There are contexts for which the scalar axis along which a situation is evaluated is expectability itself. In

⁹Because Zel’dovič considers *хоть бы* and *хоть* to be synonymous, he includes examples with both. I have chosen to accept that the choice of *хоть бы* makes no semantic difference in this context.

these instances, Zel'dovič simply omits expectability as a last requirement from his list. The necessity of including expectability, even in contexts where that quality is not the focus of the evaluation, calls his simple scalar quantity explanation into question. If expectability serves as a scalar axis in one formulation, its appearance in the others suggests a more complex nature to the role of *хоть* in identifying a liminal situation.

We will see in Chapter VI that Zel'dovič's expectability is a function of a prototype to which a speaker is referring when he assesses the acceptability of a situation highlighted by *хоть*.

While Wade, Vasilyeva, and Zel'dovič provide a synchronic approach to the particle *хоть*, another type of theoretical approach to the particle exists – a historical one. Nikolaeva & Fužeron (1999) take a historical approach to the lexical items *хоть* and *хотя*. Drawing on etymological evidence and the research of other historical linguists, they make several interesting suggestions about the particle *хоть*.

Nikolaeva & Fužeron (1999: 19-21) suggest that *хоть* and *хотя* are not distinguishable in most contexts when they are used as conjunctions. Nikolaeva & Fužeron (1999: 17) also note: “Важна, таким образом, идея, что даже в одном языке и одном стиле отделить союз от частицы, а частицу от междометия бывает не всегда возможно”. (Thus, it is important, that even in one language and one style it is not always possible to separate conjunction from particle or particle from interjection.) While *хоть* is not mistaken for an interjection, the line between particle and conjunction is difficult to draw.

Nikolaeva & Fužeron suggest the possibility of a source for *хотѣ* different from the one suggested by most authors who assume that *хотѣ* is a reduction of *хотѣа*, the deverbal abverb from *хотѣти* ‘want’. Nikolaeva & Fužeron suggest that *хотѣ*’s source might also be an obsolete imperative form of *хотѣти* ‘to want’: *хотѣи*. While this thesis is a synchronic analysis, Nikolaeva & Fužeron’s hypothesis, in light of the frequency that *хотѣ* highlights an imperative, suggests that an overall meaning of the particle may be related to a syntactic role. The possibility that *хотѣ* is a historical imperative suggests that the particle is playing a syntactic role that is not transparent when *хотѣ* is judged as a particle. An examination of the syntactic nature of *хотѣ* may lead to a greater understanding of the particle’s semantic nature.

Semantically, we have seen in this chapter that the meaning of *хотѣ* is difficult to delineate. The particle has properties that seem to be more structural in nature – for instance, as we saw in Examples 13 and 14, *хотѣ* seems to be able to provide a positive or negative reading. Nikolaeva & Fužeron’s hypothesis about the origins of *хотѣ* suggests another avenue of inquiry to locate a unified role for this particle – a syntactic one. It is not clear what part of speech *хотѣ* is and what sort of role it plays in an utterance. We will see in Chapters III and IV that defining the syntactic role of *хотѣ* is challenging, but by approaching the particle in this fashion, we are better able to find a cohesive picture of its meaning.

CHAPTER III

The Syntactic Category of *хоть*

In this chapter, I will address the syntactic nature of *хоть*: What does it mean to say that *хоть* is a particle? What part of speech is *хоть*? I will briefly discuss the term “particle”, noting that many authors (Franks & King, Zwicky, Klavans) have found the blanket term “particle” unsatisfactory as a syntactic category. The category of clitics is proposed as an alternative, and I will discuss some definitions and parameters of this category. Within this discussion, I will apply the assertions of two authors – Zwicky and Klavans – to the Russian particle *хоть*.

All of the authors cited in Chapter I (Vasilyeva, Wade, Zel’dovič, Lobanova & Slesareva) describe *хоть* as a particle. Zwicky (1985: 290) states the following about the term “particle”:

“The particle is a ubiquitous notion in syntax. The most common use of the term is to label items which, in contrast to those in established word classes of a language, have (a) peculiar semantics and (b) idiosyncratic distributions. Thus ‘particle’ is a cover term for items that do not fit easily into syntactic and semantic generalizations about the language”.

Thus, one traditional approach relegates words that behave as Zwicky describes to the grammatical non-category of “particle”. As Zwicky points out, this classification presents a problem for formal syntacticians. For example, der Dikken (1995: 33), who writes largely about English language particles, defines the term particle: “In this study, particle refers to the class of non-Case-assigning, argument-taking

prepositional elements”. However, other authors have begun to move away from study-specific definitions and toward definitions of particle types. For example, Franks & King (2000: 102) note the existence of interrogative particles like *–li*, appearing in Czech, Russian and other Slavic languages. Here in Czech, glossed as Q(uestion):

- (28) Nevíme, mají-li dnes medovinu.¹⁰
 [neg-know.1PL have.3PL-Q today mead.]
 ‘We don’t know whether they have mead today.’

Franks & King (2000: 37) also note an “optative” particle in Slovenian, *naj*, glossed as ‘opt’ in the following example:

- (29) Naj te on pokliče.
 [opt you.ACC he.NOM call]
 ‘Let him call you.’

Franks & King (2000: 11) note another type that “comprises discourse particles, which provide emphasis, perspective, and so on”. They provide the following example, *že*, an emphatic particle, glossed ‘emph’, from Russian:

- (30) On vernetsja segodnja že.
 [He.NOM return.3SG today emph.]
 ‘He is coming back this very day.’

Franks & King (2000: 11) say the following about discourse particles: “In general these [discourse particles] do not have particularly interesting properties as far as their prosodic and syntactic status is concerned, and hence they are not discussed in detail in this volume”. This position contrasts with Zwicky’s contention that particles have been labeled as such in part because their syntactic status is difficult to analyze. Because *xom̃* is not treated in Franks & King’s volume, we cannot know how they might have classified *xom̃* in their typology.

¹⁰I have left Franks & King’s glosses and translations intact.

The syntactic status of some of these lexical items labeled particles is open to debate. As we have seen in Chapter I, Fužeron & Nikolaeva assert that differentiating the particulate meaning of *xomь* from the conjunctive meaning proves difficult. This is not the only case in which a particle can have an ambiguous classification. For instance, Franks & King (2000: 103) include Czech *však* ‘but’ or ‘after all’ in a list of “other Czech particles” and say the following:

“[L]et us mention the various other sentence “particles” that can be destressed and thereby function as part of the clitic string...As can be seen from the list, which is not meant to be exhaustive, particles bear a range of adverbial functions. Their meanings are subtle, and the glosses are suggestive at best”.

However, Heim (1982: 206) notes that *však* can serve as an enclitic “in the meaning ‘but’” but that “in the meaning ‘after all’ (= *vždyt’* ‘after all’) it stands at the beginning of the sentence or clause”. Franks & King do not address the possibility that there are two manifestations of *však* ‘after all’ or that one or both may not have a particulate meaning.

The possibility of multiple characterizations for particles validates one of Zwicky’s objections: There is little to unify these acategorical words as a class. Zwicky (1985: 293) states that “[t]here seem to be no grammatical generalizations that are correctly stated in terms of this distinction [between categorical and acategorical words]...the whole set of ‘particles’ in a language do not hang together in a grammatically interesting way”.

Moreover, Zwicky notes that lexical items classified as particles often share grammatical properties with members of other syntactic categories. This overlap of function is not possible in the generative, feature-based approach Zwicky endorses. Therefore, he rejects particles as a category.

The term “particle” is not without meaning, even if it is problematic as a unified syntactic category within the generative framework. Vinogradov (1947: 663) defines the term particle as such:

“Particles are classes of those words which, as rule, have no completely independent real, or material, meaning, but for the most part introduce additional shades into the meanings of other words, phrases and sentences, or are used to express all kinds of grammatical (and consequently, logical and expressive) relations. The lexical meaning of these words corresponds with their grammatical, logical, stylistic and expressive functions. Therefore, the semantic range of particles is extremely wide, their lexical and grammatical meanings are very flexible, and they are at the mercy of their syntactic use”.¹¹

Vasilyeva follows Vinogradov in his application of the term.

While the purpose of the current work is to find unifying semantic and syntactic principles associated with *хоть*, Vinogradov’s use of the term particle acknowledges that particles do not have meanings independent of the host elements. *Хоть* cannot appear alone, and therefore cannot have a semantic or syntactic existence that is separate from the lexical items to which it is attached. There is no item or action to which *хоть* can refer without another constituent. I will follow Vinogradov and Vasilyeva in using the term *particle* to acknowledge this syntactically dependent relationship, even while attempting to find a more unified framework for this lexical item. To this end I will now examine the class *clitics* to determine whether *хоть* is a member of this class of dependent lexical items. Clitic describes a class of lexical elements that are syntactically dependent on other elements in a sentence. While particles as Vinogradov describes them are not the same class as clitics, there are some similarities and an examination of clitics may clarify the syntactic nature of *хоть*.

¹¹Vasilyeva’s translation of Vinogradov

In many languages there are lexical items which do not fit clearly into the category of an affix, but are dependent on other elements in the sentence and are not, therefore, independent words. Some formal syntacticians (Zwicky, Franks & King, Klavans) suggest a new grammatical class for these items: clitics. Russian *хоть* is not an affix, but it cannot exist alone. As Vasilyeva and Wade have noted, *хоть* always appears attached to another constituent in the sentence. Because *хоть* is an element that appears to belong in the gray area between affix and independent word, we need to examine the possibility that *хоть* is a clitic. If it is, we must ascertain whether the syntactic nature of this particle will clarify the various semantic roles that *хоть* plays, as described by Wade, Vasilyeva, Lobanova & Slesareva.

Here I will examine the conclusions of two authors on the subject of clitics: Zwicky and Klavans. Zwicky and Klavans differ in their approaches. Zwicky is interested in assigning broad categories to clitics in order to define the class. Klavans uses a purely syntactic approach and attempts to devise a classification system that encompasses all clitics in all languages. Neither system precludes the categorization of *хоть* as a clitic, but neither provides a compelling answer to the question: What is the function of *хоть* in an utterance?

Zwicky was among the first to seriously address clitics and attempt to formalize the category. He acknowledges that these elements merit attention in the generative framework as “the generative grammarian striving for both precision and generalization in linguistic descriptions has, in fact, led to the uncovering of a host of analytic problems [based on clitics]” (Zwicky 1977: 1).

Zwicky uses the following example (from Stevens 1971) to present his contention that a new syntactic category – that of clitics – is required to address some lexical items. The

example is from Madurese, which has a reduplicative morpheme. This element, *-pul-*, “shows alternative orders with respect to other morphemes” (Zwicky 1977: 1-2):

- (31) i - pa - pul - kumpul
[Passive causative R base]
‘Kept on being gathered’
(But also: *i-pul-pa-kumpul*, and for some speakers *pul-i-pa-kumpul*)

All of these compound forms have the meaning ‘kept on being gathered’, with the morpheme *-pul-* adding the meaning of ‘keep on doing’ or ‘continuing’. Zwicky points out that it is unclear that *-pul-* is merely an affix, because it demonstrates the syntactic structure of an independent word in “free word order” languages. With the theoretical questions raised by the classification of *-pul-*, Zwicky begins a typology of items that raise similar questions about their syntactic status. I will sketch that typology here.

Zwicky puts all clitics into three categories: special clitics, simple clitics, and bound words (sometimes called bound morphemes). Zwicky (1977: 3) defines special clitics as “cases where an unaccented bound form acts as a variant of a stressed free form with the same cognitive meaning and with similar phonological makeup”. Specifically, Zwicky has in mind alternate or short forms of accented pronouns that can be found in many Slavic and Romance languages.

Zwicky’s (1977: 5) second category is simple clitics: “[C]ases where a free morpheme, when unaccented, may be phonologically reduced. In these cases, the resulting form is phonologically subordinated to a neighboring word”. Examples of simple clitics are the contractions and phonological reductions familiar in English: *Did you see ‘r?* or, *He isn’t coming*.

Zwicky's third category is that of "bound words". As *xom̃* is not obviously a reduction of a longer form, it is this third category into which *xom̃* would likely fall. The origin of these clitics is less clear and the definition somewhat more complex. These bound words are:

"cases where a morpheme that is always bound and always unaccented shows considerable syntactic freedom, in the sense that they can be associated with words of a variety of morphosyntactic categories. Frequently, such a bound word is semantically associated with an entire constituent while being phonologically attached to one word of this constituent, and ordinarily the bound word is located at the very margins of the word, standing outside even inflectional affixes" (Zwicky 1977: 6).

This broad category needs explanation and Zwicky provides several examples of this phenomenon. An example of a morpheme syntactically connected to a host word is Latin -*que* 'and':

- (32) *Duasque ibi legionis conscribit*¹²
[Two and there legions-G (he) enrolls-np-s]
'And he enrolls two legions there'

The morpheme -*que* 'and' is attached to only one word but is associated with a larger syntactic constituent – in this case the clause *Duas ibi legionis conscribit* 'he enrolls two legions there'. The morpheme -*que* 'and' can attach to a variety of constituents. Zwicky notes this quality is shared by the English possessive 's structure (*Germany's defenses*, but *the queen of England's hat* and *the man who introduced us's house*). Additionally, -*que* 'and' shares with 's that it can connect to a word even after morphologically inflected endings, as in:

- (33) *Arma virumque cano*
[Arms-A man-A -and sing-np-s]
'I sing of arms and the man'
(from the invocation at the beginning of Vergil's *Aeneid*)

¹²The example and translation are from Zwicky. The gloss is mine.

Virum ‘man’ is inflected for case and *–que* attaches without affecting the preceding morphology.

Examples of clitics that are syntactically unconnected morphemes also exist. Zwicky (1977: 7) cites Tagalog adverbial particles, which “are associated semantically with an entire sentence”. The interrogative particle *ba* appears directly after the first word (Zwicky’s examples are from Schachter 1974):

- (34) Nakita ba ni Juan si Maria ngayon?
[Has seen BA agent Juan topic Maria today?]
or:
Ngayon ba nakita ni Juan si Maria?
[Today BA has seen agent Juan topic Maria?]
Both: ‘Has Juan seen Maria today?’

Ba can also follow a negative particle:

- (35) Hindi ba nakita ni Juan si Maria ngayon?
[Not BA has seen agent Juan topic Maria today?]
‘Hasn’t Juan seen Maria today?’

Zwicky makes several claims that Klavans challenges directly. For instance, Zwicky infers from the evidence presented by simple and special clitics that many words take a historical path from word to clitic to affix. This historical progression is a claim that Klavans challenges as unprovable and unlikely, because many languages lack a clitic phase and because Klavans feels Zwicky has misinterpreted his data. By 1985 Zwicky has dropped this claim. Despite Klavans’s objections, it is interesting to note that *хоть* does originate from an independent word, the verb *хотеть* ‘want’. Vasilyeva’s and Nikolaeva & Fužeron’s accounts present two possibilities: *хоть* might be derived from *хотя* ‘wanting’ (the verbal adverb form of *хотеть* ‘want’) or might be derived from the obsolete imperative *хому* ‘want!’. Both possibilities indicate that *хоть* is derived from an independent word.

In reference to *хоть*, we must acknowledge that one possible source of the particle, *хотя* ‘wanting’ (the verbal adverb form of *хотеть* ‘want’), shows no signs of disappearing. Another argument against historical progression from word to clitic to affix is the existence of *хотя бы* ‘even’, ‘at least’, etc., which serves a syntactic and semantic role synonymous to *хоть*. This synonym of *хоть* is more complex syntactically and unlikely to become an affix in the future. While Zwicky’s historical argument provides him with at least a putative source for simple and special clitics, he admits that bound words provide a challenge in this regard: “For the remaining special clitics and bound words, there is frequently no class of nonclitic constituents to which a clitic can be assigned, so that its syntactic source is not clear” (Zwicky 1977: 13). Zwicky (1977: 18) notes that bound words “accumulate at certain points within the sentence”. This position is most often second position in a sentence or clause. Zwicky (1977: 18) adds “[t]he best general hypothesis that I can suggest about where these clitics appear is that clitics whose source is within a particular constituent (an NP or an S) move either to one of the margins of that constituent or to the head of that constituent (the N or the V)”.

Although clitics were identified initially because they are phonologically unstressed, Zwicky and Klavans both caution that phonological tests are inherently unreliable. I will, for the most part, heed Zwicky and Klavans’s advice, and leave the phonological tests for clitics untouched. However, I will note that Vasilyeva allows for the possibility of a phonologically reduced *хоть* in a position after the host element. While enclitic *хоть* is rare, its presence could be explored using a theory of clitics that relies more heavily on phonological reduction than on syntactic factors.

Zwicky returns to the issue of what constitutes a clitic in 1985. Asserting that his earlier work was broad and “pre-theoretical”, Zwicky (1985: 284) addresses the fact that “the recent literature on clitics is very much inclined to assume that anything labeled a ‘particle’ is a clitic”. The source of this confusion lies in his third category (bound words), the broadest and most loosely defined of Zwicky’s categories. Zwicky (1985: 283) differs with attempts – like Klavan’s – to provide parameters for all clitics: “There is not much point in proposing that cliticization is an ordinary syntactic operation, describable by the same formalism as ordinary syntactic rules, and capable of interacting with them”. Zwicky (1985: 284) acknowledges Klavans’s attempt to formalize clitics as a class, but adds “[Klavans] supplies little in the way of tests to distinguish clitics from other units”. Zwicky (1985: 284) notes that authors (Klavans 1982 and Zwicky and Pullum 1983a) have put forth tests to distinguish clitics from affixes, but states that “there is no comparable summary treatment of the other side of the question: the differentiation of clitics from independent words”. Because Zwicky considers terms like “word” and “clitic” theoretical primitives, he asserts that linguistic tests cannot provide information that is both necessary and sufficient to make the distinction of clitic from word. Nevertheless, Zwicky (1985: 285) notes that the tests he provides will – analogous to a medical diagnosis – catalog the “symptoms of the linguistic state of affairs”. Though no one of Zwicky’s tests is definitive, he argues that a preponderance of evidence is compelling. I will apply those of Zwicky’s tests that are applicable to Russian *хоть*:

A. Binding. Zwicky (1985: 287) asserts: “If an element is bound, and especially if it cannot appear in complete isolation, it should be a clitic; if free and especially if it appears in complete isolation, it should be an independent word”. Here the test supports the

hypothesis that *xoṃb* is a clitic. It is impossible to find *xoṃb* in complete isolation, even in the most colloquial registers; it always appears in conjunction with the word or phrase it emphasizes.

B. Ordering. Zwicky (1985: 288) notes: “An element that is strictly ordered with respect to adjacent morphemes is almost surely a clitic (or an affix), while an element exhibiting free order with respect to adjacent words is certainly an independent word”. *Xoṃb* does not exhibit free word order with respect to the host constituent: The particle must appear on the margin of the highlighted constituent, in most cases to the left.

C. Deletion. Clitics should not delete under identity. That is, “it follows that, in an X + Y combination, if either X or Y is deletable under identity [that is while retaining the original meaning of the utterance], then X and Y are words; neither is a clitic” (Zwicky 1985: 288). We noted in Vasilyeva’s examples (Chapter I: Examples 13 and 14) that *xoṃb* appears without a negative particle in positions where other particles would require one. In these instances it is impossible to delete *xoṃb* and preserve the meaning of the utterance. Therefore, *xoṃb* is serving an indispensable purpose in the sentence.

E. Movement. Independent words should be able to move in the sentence. However, in any X + Y combination of clitic + word, one element should not be free to move without the other (Zwicky 1985: 289). In the case of *xoṃb* the particle and its attached constituent maintain a strict order with respect to each other. Moving one element without the other is not possible.

F. Distribution. Zwicky indicates that distribution should be a general consideration in determining the status of a lexical item. Affixes usually attach to a certain kind of constituent (*-ing* with verbs, *-ness* with nouns, etc.). Zwicky (1985: 288) asserts: “Clear

cases of clitics typically behave like affixes in this respect, having distributions describable by single principles, like ‘combines with the head of a clause’”. *Хоть* can connect to a wide variety of constituents, and this variety of attachment possibilities points to the adverbial nature of *хоть*. This test suggests that *хоть* functions as an independent word.

G. Complexity. Zwicky notes that clitics are usually not morphologically complex. Specifically, words can be analyzed as two or more morphemes, whereas clitics usually cannot. While *хоть* is not morphologically complex, its synonym *хотя бы* is. That *хотя бы* serves the same syntactic and symbolic role indicates that *хоть* is an independent word. In addition, Vasilyeva suggests other synonyms for *хоть* (*даже* ‘even’, *даже если* ‘even if’, *прямо* ‘straight away’, *по крайней мере* ‘at least’, etc.) that are morphologically complex or can be classified as different parts of speech.

Applying Zwicky’s tests to *хоть* gives more positive evidence that *хоть* might belong in the category of clitic than evidence against such an inclusion. Four out of six tests suggest that *хоть* is a clitic, while two suggest that the particle is an independent word.

Klavans begins her typology of clitics with a new focus on second position (2P) clitics and special clitics: the phonologically reduced and verb-dependent personal pronouns. Klavans acknowledges that often a 2P clitic is the second word, but it can also follow a syntactic group (for instance, an NP, a word, or even a CP). Unlike Zwicky, Klavans does not differentiate between 2P clitics and personal pronouns, which often appear in second position. Klavans points out that all three of Zwicky’s categories – special clitics, simple clitics and bound words – do not have easily defined boundaries. One category runs into another.

Zwicky's typology is based in part on the semantic nature of the clitic. Klavans argues that a semantic difference (not a syntactic one) separates an interrogative clitic in second position from a reduced pronoun in second position. Klavans claims that semantic features should not factor into a typology of the lexical items when defining a syntactic class. Klavans also asserts that the category of bound words is too broad, and cites the reduced English copula in rapid speech as an example. Its syntactic structure resembles the structure of the possessive 's, as it can attach to a variety of elements.

- | | |
|---|-------------------------------|
| (36) My motorcycle's broken. | (noun + copula) ¹³ |
| (37) It's broken. | (pronoun + copula) |
| (38) The motorcycle I looked at's broken. | (preposition + copula) |
| (39) The motorcycle I bought's broken | (verb + copula) |

Klavans (1982: 58) asserts:

“in each case the copula is “weakly connected” both semantically and syntactically (a property of bound words, in Zwicky's formulation). However, for Zwicky, such contractions in English are SIMPLE CLITICS, while at the same time they seem to have more in common with ‘bound words’. Once again the division into BOUND WORD and SIMPLE CLITIC seems to obscure similarities between bound morphemes”.

Possessive 's and copular 's make significantly different semantic contributions. One is a reduction of the copula and has a form that clearly indicates a logical, strictly phonological reduction. The possessive 's represents a less phonologically reducible structure, one in which no logical simple reduction can be made. However, Klavans asserts that the emphasis of any work on clitics must be purely syntactic and attempts to determine such syntactic criteria for clitic formation.

¹³Examples are from Klavans 1982: 58

Klavans's work is both a recapitulation of the previous theoretical work on clitics and a set of five parameters with which she proposes to catalog all clitics in all languages. Klavans operates from two basic hypotheses: First, cliticization is a unitary phenomenon, and second, it can be described by a set of five parameters for clitics in all languages. Klavans (1995: 94) notes: "It has been asserted throughout [Klavans's paper] that the examples are all of clitics. Although they may vary somewhat from language to language, they do not reflect altogether different phenomena. What these elements have in common is that they are neither affixes nor free words". Klavans (1995: 99) states that it has often been assumed that clitic placement follows two different principles: Either clitics are placed in the second position in the sentence, or attached to a certain lexical category – often the verb. Klavans cites Perlmutter who acknowledges second position and adjacent-to-the-verb as possibilities for cliticization, and George & Toman who more broadly accept second position and adjacency to a certain lexical category. Desiring to present a unified approach, Klavans (1995: 100) concludes: "views like [Perlmutter's and George & Toman's] are too limited: they are based on data from primarily one language or one language family. In addition, the division of clitics into two types – lexical and Second Position – is too simplistic and thus inadequate". Klavans believes that if all of these lexical elements are neither affixes nor free words, then a standardized approach to categorizing them must exist.

The standard approach Klavans proposes is her five-parameter system. Arguing that this system can be used to classify clitics in all languages, Klavans presents five parameters, labeled P1-P5 below:

P1: Clitic Identity: Klavans hypothesizes that the clitic has some inherent feature that identifies it as a clitic syntactically: "I will assume, following Pullum (1980), that clitics are

marked with a lexical feature by which they can be identified (P1). For George and Toman, the feature is [+clitic]...My assumption is that cliticization rules can recognize clitics on the basis of a lexical specification” (1995: 101). This assertion is difficult to check, but Klavans argues that such a parameter must exist, just as syntactically some words are recognizably [+Noun].¹⁴

P2: Domain of Cliticization: “A node N is the Domain of Cliticization for a clitic \underline{c} if the syntactic position of \underline{c} is determined with respect to the immediate constituents of the designated node N” (1995: 101). In other words, a node is a domain of cliticization if the clitic is attached at the level of the node’s daughters. In Klavans’s example =*ndu* is the clitic. In the figure below (Example from Ngiyamba, Klavans 1995: 101), the Domain of Cliticization is S because the clitic =*ndu* is attached at the level of daughters of S.




Fig.3. 1: Parameter of Domain of Cliticization

P3: Initial/Final: “The parameter initial/final refers to the first or last constituent or word under the Domain of Cliticization. That is, P3 is the host phrase for or word relevant for clitic attachment” (Klavans 1995: 104). Klavans illustrates her parameters throughout with the same sentence used to illustrate P2. For the example below, the relevant constituent is N

¹⁴We will see in Chapter 4 that some authors – Croft in particular – take issue with the idea that parts of speech are language primitives identified by features recognized by syntactic rules.

(*ηadhay guya* ‘tasty fish’). Because *ηadhay guya* ‘tasty fish’ is the initial element under the Domain of Cliticization S, P3 is initial.




Fig.3. 2 Parameter of Initial/Final

P4: Before/After: This parameter “refers to the locus of clitic attachment” (Klavans 1995: 107) with respect to the relevant node, here *ηadhay guya* ‘tasty fish’. If the Clitic attaches to the left of the node, P4 is Before; if to the right, P4 is After. In this example, P4 is After:




Fig.3. 3 Parameter of Before/After

P5: Proclitic/Enclitic: Klavans proposes that this feature is inherent to the clitic. This parameter describes the way in which the clitic attaches phonologically to the host word. If it does so before the host word, it is proclitic; if after the host word, it is enclitic. The morpheme *-que* in Zwicky’s examples (32 and 33) would be enclitic. Klavans depicts this attachment with a = at the site of attachment. Thus proclitics are depicted *clitic=* and

enclitics as =*clitic*. The above example gives an enclitic =*ndu*. The English possessive 's is another example of an enclitic.

While it seems intuitive that a proclitic should have a locus of attachment Before, rendering P4 and P5 redundant, Klavans argues that this is not the case. She posits the possibility of rightward syntactic attachment with leftward phonological liaison, as shown below:




Fig.3. 4: Rightward syntactic attachment with leftward phonological liaison

Klavans is less interested in providing a theory of clitics than she is in providing a syntactic framework in which to discuss them. Unlike Zwicky, Klavans does not address how it might be possible to test a potential case for the feature [+clitic]. Klavans proposes a catalog of parameters for words that linguists have labeled as clitics, the clearest examples of which are second position pronominal clitics.

Nonetheless, *xom̃* can be shown to conform to Klavans's parameters. I will address them in order. P1: Clitic Identity. It is difficult to prove that a lexical item has a clitic identity marker, as such a marker is not evident in the surface form of the word. Vasilyeva (2002: 155) asserts that *xom̃* attaches to some element of the sentence and provides "proportional emphasis". This relationship of attachment is inflexible; the particle cannot be separated from its host. The attachment to the host may be the only outward sign of a theoretical quality [+clitic].

The Domain of Cliticization (P2) varies according to what constituent is being cliticized, but would exist and be identifiable in any sentence which included *xom̃*. Although Initial/Final (P3) as a parameter would vary in Klavans's structure, initial and final positions are both possible for *xom̃*. *Xom̃* can attach syntactically and phonologically to the same element, indicating that the parameter of Before corresponds to the parameter Proclitic, and After corresponds to Enclitic.

Based on Klavans's system of parameters and Zwicky's tests, there is significant evidence that *xom̃* might belong in the lexical category of clitic. Klavans's system does not preclude the membership of *xom̃* into this class. Although Zwicky's tests are not conclusive, they provide considerable evidence that *xom̃* behaves in many ways as a clitic.

However, even if we had compelling evidence that *xom̃* is a clitic, we would be left with the question of what to do with that information. The categorization of *xom̃* as a clitic leaves many fundamental questions unanswered: If *xom̃* is a clitic, what does that indicate about its role in the sentence? Why does the particle seem to have different, even contradictory meanings? How can *xom̃* give a positive or a negative emphasis to the lexical items in identical syntactic frameworks, as we saw in Chapter II? Klavans provides a framework for a discussion of the particle in the sentence but no theoretical information about the class of clitics. Zwicky provides a typology of elements that might be clitics and gives tests that aid in their classification, but little input about the unified role of clitics is given.

In Chapter II, we noted that an examination of *xom̃* based on purely semantic considerations seemed to leave some of the particle's behavior unexplained. The reverse – a purely syntactic analysis – also does not provide a complete picture of the role that *xom̃*

plays in a sentence. In Chapter IV, we will attempt to find an approach that unites the semantic properties and the syntactic properties of *χομή*.

In the next chapter, we will examine a syntactic theory that provides a more unified approach to the meaning of *χομή*. This approach is outlined in Croft's (2001) *Radical Construction Grammar*. A construction grammar suggests a unified symbolic role for *χομή* in which the semantic identity and syntactic identity cannot be examined separately. Defining the combined syntactic and semantic role will clarify the meaning of *χομή* by detailing the function of the speaker's symbolic understanding of the particle's role with respect to the attached constituent.

CHAPTER IV

A Different Syntactic Approach: A Construction Grammar

As the controversy over clitics as a syntactic class discussed in Chapter III demonstrates, there are lexical items that do not have an obvious syntactic classification. *Xom̂* is such an item. Moreover, the brief discussion of *xom̂* in Chapter I showed that the semantic profile of this item is not clear-cut. The authors (Vasilyeva, Wade, Zel'dovič) who have written about the particle believe that it is impossible to establish the meaning of this particle without the surrounding context. In this Chapter, I will discuss an approach that arises from the need to classify items with idiosyncratic semantic or syntactic behavior. Traditionally, phrasal items with semantic and syntactic irregularities have been recognized as idioms. The questions that these items raise for linguists in terms of their syntax and their semantic qualities have given rise to a new approach to their analysis, namely construction grammars. We will see that construction grammar provides a framework in which to discuss *xom̂*, which as we have seen, is not semantically or syntactically straightforward.

Generative syntax largely attempts to address the problem of how language learners, who have a limited input, can nonetheless generate an unlimited set of linguistic output. Formal syntacticians argue that speakers are not merely memorizing sentences and repeating them. But by what process can speakers learn to construct well-formed utterances? The response of generative grammar to this problem is to postulate that linguistic information is organized

into distinct components: a syntactic component, a semantic component, a phonological component, etc.¹⁵ and the lexicon, which supplies the speaker with all of the required componential information for any given lexical item. Therefore, each word is stored in the lexicon with the relevant information for each distinct component of language knowledge: the phonological representation of the word, how it combines syntactically with other lexical items, etc. Each component may be related to another by a series of highly general linking rules, but the components remain distinct modules, and the linking rules are sufficiently general to apply for all entries in the lexicon.

As we have noted in Chapters II and III, *xom̃* seems to possess semantic and syntactic idiosyncrasies. In this way, *xom̃* demonstrates tendencies that distinguish idioms. Because *xom̃* shares idiosyncrasies with idiomatic constructions, we will examine a syntactic approach that was created specifically to address the syntactic qualities of idioms. Fillmore, Kay & O'Connor (1988: 504) note that idioms appear to be exceptions to the generative componential model:

“Such a list of exceptional phenomena contains things which are larger than words, which are like words in that they have to be learned separately as individual whole facts about pieces of the language, but which also have grammatical structure, structure of the kind that we ordinarily interpret by appealing to the operation of the general grammatical rules”.

By definition, idioms are irregular in some way, running counter to the expected rules of semantics or syntax. Items like *kick the bucket* when the intended meaning is the semantically unpredictable ‘die’ and *all of a sudden* which is syntactically irregular, seem outside the purview of the rules that govern the combination of regular lexical items. A strict definition of idiomaticity is elusive. Fillmore *et al.* (1988: 504) define an idiom as follows:

¹⁵Different theories of syntax posit different components, but syntactic, semantic and phonological components appear in most formulations.

“We think of a locution or manner of speaking as idiomatic if it is assigned an interpretation by the speech community but if somebody who merely knew that grammar and the vocabulary of the language could not, by virtue of that knowledge alone, know (i) how to say it, or (ii) what it means, or (iii) whether it is a conventional thing to say. Put differently, an idiomatic expression or construction is something a language user could fail to know, while knowing everything else in the language”.

Nunberg, Sag & Wasow (1994: 498) argue that while idioms often reflect several different semantic tendencies, the only one required is “their relative conventionality, which is determined by the discrepancy between the idiomatic phrasal meaning and the meaning we would predict for the collocation if we were to consult only the rules that determine the meanings of the constituents in isolation, and the relevant operations of semantic composition”.

The notion that idioms have syntactic and semantic properties on the phrasal level contradicts the basic proposition of the componential model of grammar, namely that the combination of the lexicon and a sufficient number of rules should be able to generate all well-formed utterances in a given language. One simple resolution is to suggest that some idiomatic expressions might be stored within the lexicon itself. However, Fillmore *et al.* detail the various types of idioms, many of which do not permit a solution which lists them as complete entries in the lexicon. Fillmore *et al.* discuss idioms in terms of their features. In order to better understand the role of Russian *xom6* in the construction grammar that Fillmore *et al.* propose, I will examine these authors’ discussion of the concepts relating to indidiomaticity.

Encoding versus Decoding Idioms:

Fillmore *et al.* (1988: 504-5) define a decoding idiom as “an expression which the language user couldn’t interpret with complete confidence if they hadn’t learned it separately”.

Examples of decoding idioms include (from Fillmore *et al.*) *kick the bucket* and *pull a fast*

one. An encoding idiom is described as “an expression which language users might or might not understand without prior experience, but concerning which they would not know that it is a conventional way of saying what it says” (Fillmore *et al.* 1988: 505). Examples given include *answer the door*, *wide awake*, and *bright red*. The authors note that any decoding idiom is necessarily an encoding idiom, meaning that if a speaker cannot figure out the conventional meaning of the idiom, he cannot possibly guess that the expression conventionally has that meaning.

Grammatical versus Extragrammatical Idioms:

Grammatical idioms are “those which have words filling proper and familiar grammatical structures, and those which have words occurring in constructions which the rest of the grammar can account for” (Fillmore *et al.* 1988: 505). A grammatical idiom follows regular syntactic rules of combination, but its meaning is unpredictable in terms of semantic rules.

The authors provide examples: *kick the bucket*, *spill the beans*, *blow one’s nose*.

Extragrammatical idioms do not obey regular rules of syntactic combination, and Fillmore *et al.* (1988: 505) define these items as combinations, which “have anomalous structures.

Nothing in the rest of the grammar...would allow us to predict that these expressions are sayable in our language”. Fillmore *et al.* provide *first off*, *sight unseen*, *all of a sudden*, *by and large*, *so far so good* as examples of such idioms. The frequency of these items can be emphasized by the fact that Nunberg *et al.* (1994: 515) add substantially to Fillmore *et al.*’s list: *No can do*; *trip the light fantastic*; *kingdom come*; *battle royal*; *Handsome is as handsome does*; *Would that it were...*; *every which way* and others.

Substantive (Lexically Filled) versus Formal (Lexically Open):

Substantive idioms possess the quality that “their lexical makeup is (more or less) fully specified” (Fillmore *et al.* 1988: 505). Croft & Cruse (2004: 233) note that the example “*It takes one to know one*” is completely fixed; one cannot even alter the tense (**It took one to know one*”). Formal idioms are “syntactic patterns dedicated to semantic and pragmatic purposes not knowable from their form alone” (Fillmore *et al.* 1988: 505). Components of formal idioms are not strictly specified and allow some variation. The authors provide the example of *blow one’s nose*, in which the person blowing the nose and the tense of the verb can change. In a footnote Fillmore *et al.* observe: “What we have here is actually a gradient or cline, rather than a simple two-way distinction” (1988: 505, n.3). Idioms can range from completely lexically specified to largely unspecified. Fillmore *et al.* (1988: 505 n.3) note “[t]he best examples of formal idioms are special syntactic patterns whose use is not predictable from the ‘regular’ grammatical rules, as in expressions fitting the pattern *Him, be a doctor?*”. A note about terminology: Both Croft (2001) and Croft & Cruse (2004) follow Langacker (2000) in referring to formal idioms as schematic idioms. I will use the terms interchangeably.

Fillmore *et al.* (1988: 506) note that substantive idioms are sometimes a specific case of formal idioms:

“A fact which sometimes obscures the difference between substantive and formal is that formal idioms can serve as host to substantive idioms. For example there is the general syntactic pattern illustrated by such sentences as 1:

(1) *The more carefully you do your work, the easier it will get.*

While 1 may be a novel creation using the syntactic pattern in question, 2 is a set expression of the same form.

(2) *The bigger they come, the harder they fall*” .

Idioms with or without pragmatic point:

Idioms with a pragmatic point are generally used in some specific pragmatic context.

Fillmore *et al.* (1988: 506) give *How do you do?*, *once upon a time* and “the type exemplified in *Him, be a doctor?*” as examples. Idioms without a pragmatic point do not have an associated pragmatic context or are pragmatically neutral. Examples include *all of a sudden*, *by and large*, and the *X-er the Y-er* type found in *The more carefully you do your work, the easier it will get* (Fillmore *et al.* 1988: 506). Although Fillmore *et al.* do not suggest that this distinction may be a graded one as opposed to a binary distinction, I believe that a quality like ‘having a pragmatic point’ cannot but involve the sort of subjectivity that implies a graded category rather than a binary opposition.

After discussing the relevant features of idioms, Fillmore *et al.* also place idioms into three categories: (1) Unfamiliar pieces unfamiliarly arranged, (2) Familiar pieces unfamiliarly arranged, and (3) Familiar pieces familiarly arranged. Formal (or schematic) and substantive idioms can appear in all three categories, and Fillmore *et al.* are most concerned with schematic idioms. Substantive idioms present less of a challenge to traditional componential syntax. Having set formulations, these lexically filled idioms could simply be listed in the lexicon. However, schematic idioms are more challenging. As Croft & Cruse (2004: 237) note:

“Syntactic, semantic and in some cases pragmatic properties of schematic idioms cannot be predicted from the general rules of syntactic and semantic components (and the pragmatic component) or the general rules linking these components together. Instead, the syntactic, semantic (and in some cases pragmatic) properties must be directly associated with the construction. Such a representation would cut across the components in the componential model of grammatical knowledge, and hence represents a direct challenge to that model, at least for idioms”.

Fillmore *et al.* (1988: 510-1) provide a list of constructions – expressions which are phrasal, rather than lexical items – which they propose as schematic idioms. In order to classify each of the following as a formal idiom, Fillmore *et al.* suggest that for each, two questions can be answered in the negative: “(1) Does the expression exhibit properties that are fully predictable from independently known properties of its lexical makeup and its grammatical structure? (2) Does the expression deserve to be listed in a general phrasal lexicon of the language, and treated as a fixed expression?”

- (40) a. There goes Charlie again, ranting and raving about his cooking.
b. Look who’s where!
c. what with the kids off to school and all
d. Why not fix it yourself?
e. He’s not half the doctor you are.
f. Much as I like Ronnie, I don’t approve of anything he does.
g. He may be a professor, but he’s an idiot.
h. Him be a doctor?
i. What do you say we stop here?
j. It’s time you brushed your teeth.
k. One more and I’ll leave.
l. No writing on the wall!
m. That’s not big enough of a box.
n. It satisfied my every wish.

While Fillmore *et al.* acknowledge that the answer to the two questions is open to debate, the possibility of a negative answer merits a closer look at the phenomenon.

To illustrate the need for an approach that addresses the whole construction, Fillmore *et al.* undertake a thorough syntactic and semantic analysis of schematic constructions containing the conjunction *let alone*, a relatively complicated construction. *Let alone* shares syntactic and semantic qualities with many other types of syntactic items (for instance, negative polarity items, coordinating conjunctions) and semantic items (for instance, paired focus constructions, but allowing multiple foci). Nevertheless, the construction is unique in its syntactic and semantic qualities and has a specific pragmatic context. Croft & Cruse

(2004: 240) note about Fillmore *et al.*'s discussion of *let alone* that “the *let alone* construction has its own syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties that cannot be predicted from more general rules of syntax, semantics and pragmatics”. Additionally, Croft & Cruse note that several other studies demonstrate that other constructions similarly possess properties that cannot be predicted by the regular rules of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.

Fillmore *et al.* propose a radical shift in the way the constructions – like *let alone* – are viewed. Instead of treating these items as exceptions to componential and atomistic rules of grammatical interpretation, Fillmore *et al.* (1988: 534) suggest, “a language can associate semantic information with structures larger than elementary lexical items and can associate semantic interpretation principles with syntactic configurations larger and more complex than those definable by means of single phrase structure rules”. This interpretation is a direct challenge to the componential theory, which holds that syntax and semantics are distinct components joined only by linking rules, bridged only by the lexicon, which contains information about the syntactic and semantic properties of each word. Croft & Cruse (2004: 227) illustrate the conventional approach to grammatical interpretation with the following diagram:




Fig.4. 1: Conventional Model of the Organization of Grammatical Knowledge

Pictured are the components of grammatical knowledge (the phonological, syntactic, and semantic components) and a visual representation of their relationship. The lexicon bridges the components in this diagram because each entry in the lexicon contains information relevant to the specific components. In addition, the components are joined by linking rules, which specify how elements from each component are combined. There is no place in this formulation for items with idiosyncratic phrasal semantics or syntax. Therefore, this picture is incompatible with the conclusions that Fillmore *et al.* draw concerning the syntactic and semantic nature of formal idioms.

Since the distinction between a substantive idiom and formal one is a gradient, not a binary distinction, Fillmore *et al.* (1988: 534) extend this cline to the more general syntactic rules of grammar as well: “It appears to us that the machinery needed for describing the so-called minor or peripheral constructions of the sort which has occupied us here will have to be powerful enough to be generalized to more familiar structures, in particular those represented by individual phrase structure rules”.

Croft (2001: 17) notes: “regular syntactic rules and regular rules of semantic interpretation are themselves constructions. The only difference between regular syntactic

rules and their rules of semantic interpretation is that the former are wholly schematic, while the latter retain some substantive elements”.

Compare the earlier componential picture (Croft & Cruse 2004: 256) with one revised to reflect the assumptions of a construction grammar, namely that phonological, syntactic and semantic properties are included in the constructions themselves:




Fig.4. 2: Componential Model of Grammatical Knowledge

In this diagram, the components of grammatical knowledge are the lexicon (the individual words) and constructions. The phonological, syntactic and semantic properties of each construction are included in the construction itself. All that links one construction to another in this diagram is the input of common lexical items. Syntactic, semantic, and phonological rules of combination are themselves constructions and therefore are not represented separately in this diagram. The representation depicted in this diagram, that all grammatical knowledge is viewed as a series of constructions, is the underlying assumption of all construction grammars. This general picture of the organization of grammatical knowledge into constructions does not address the way that grammatical knowledge is represented in the mind of the speaker. The picture of the componential model did address this question.

Croft & Cruse (2004: 256) note:

“A construction grammar consists of a large number of constructions of all types, from schematic syntactic constructions to substantive lexical items. All of the constructions possess properties of form (syntactic and phonological) and meaning (semantic and pragmatic). All of these constructions are organized in a particular way in a speaker’s mind”.

Types of construction grammars vary in the way they address the issues of syntactic links between the units within a construction, and in the way they imagine the organization of constructions within the mind of the speaker. The construction grammar that I will use in my analysis of *хоть* is Croft’s Radical Construction Grammar, which differs from other construction grammars in several ways, but bestows significant advantage in our treatment of the particle *хоть* and the constructions in which it appears.

Croft & Cruse (2004: 265) note that all construction grammars share the following three properties: “the independent existence of constructions as symbolic units, the uniform representation of grammatical structures, and the taxonomic organization of constructions in a grammar”. All acknowledge constructions as units with their own syntactic, semantic and pragmatic qualities.

Although Croft’s (2001) Radical Construction Grammar differs from other construction grammars in ways that I will discuss later in this chapter, Radical Construction Grammar shares the three properties listed above. Croft (2001: 18, Fig 1.2) illustrates the first property – that constructions have an independent existence as a symbolic unit – with a diagram, shown below in Fig.4.3 The syntactic properties of a construction (the upper box internal to the construction) and the semantic interpretation, i.e. the conventional interpretation of the construction (the lower box) are connected via a symbolic correspondence – a correspondence of form and meaning. This correspondence allows the construction to take on a semantic interpretation that may or may not be predicted by previously accepted rules of

syntax. Since the rules of a language's grammar are constructions in any construction grammar (including Croft's), the syntax, or grammatical form of a construction must be determined by properties that are internal to the construction, as in Fig. 4.3.




Fig.4. 3: Depiction of a construction

There is a critical difference between this formulation and the formulation depicted in Fig. 4.1, as Croft notes (2001: 19): “The central essential difference between componential syntactic theories [depicted in Fig.4.1] and construction grammar [depicted in Fig.4.3] is that the symbolic link between form and conventional meaning is internal to a construction in the latter, but is external to the syntactic and semantic components in the former (as linking rules)”. Counter to the tenets of generative syntax, form is inseparable from the conventional (including semantic, pragmatic, and discourse functional) interpretation of the construction and the relation between them is contained within the construction itself. A construction's conventional meaning is the result of a symbolic correspondence between the between form and meaning, represented by the dotted line labeled *symbolic correspondence* in the Fig 4.3.

Croft attempts to use existing terminology as much as possible, but notes that as a convention he will refer to the parts of the syntactic structure (i.e. what is above labeled *Form*) as *elements*. Croft will refer to parts of the semantic structure (labeled in the box above *Meaning*) as *components*. Lastly, he adds (2001: 21): “I will use the term *unit* to describe a symbolic part (*element* + *component*) of a construction”. For Radical Construction Grammar, as for all construction grammars, the symbolic correspondence between the syntactic and semantic properties makes a unit meaningful within the grammar of a language, rather than either component separately.

Croft also provides an exploded version of this diagram (2001: 176), illustrating the internal structure of a construction. This diagram facilitates a discussion of the ways in which Radical Construction Grammar diverges from other frameworks.




Fig.4. 4: Expanded view of a construction

Fig. 4.4 is an expanded view of Fig. 4.3. in the following senses: The picture acknowledges that constructions themselves can be made up of parts. Relations between

those parts, therefore, become a matter of interest. In the diagram above, the two syntactic elements have a syntactic relation to each other (shown by the dotted arrow) in addition to their relation as roles in the syntactic structure as a whole. The components of the semantic part of the construction are related to each other with a semantic relation. The semantic components are also related by the roles they play in the semantic structure as a whole. Each unit (element + component) has a symbolic relation joining its form and meaning, and the overall syntactic and semantic structures are related by a symbolic link between form and meaning (i.e. the form and meaning of the construction as a whole). All construction grammars have a more or less similar representation of this picture. Therefore, all constructions must be addressed as indivisible units where form and meaning are symbolic united, and in which the syntax and semantics cannot be seen as independent.

There are however, some significant differences in Radical Construction Grammar's formulation. First, in Radical Construction Grammar, constructions are the basic units, even if they are not atomic (i.e. there might be two or more units within a given construction) and therefore, Croft's is a *nonreductionist* formulation. Radical Construction Grammar does not view constructions as made up of other primitive units. This is a significant departure from Fillmore *et al.*'s (1999) formulation, Construction Grammar, in which

“[t]he meronomic [part-whole] relations of a construction in Construction Grammar are analyzed in terms largely familiar from other syntactic theories (head, modifier, predicate, argument), although they are defined somewhat differently. In Construction Grammar predicate-argument relations between elements are syntactic and semantic, and they are clearly distinguished from syntactic roles held by elements in the construction as a whole” (Croft & Cruse, 2004: 270).

Croft rejects the notion that parts of speech (Noun, Adjective, and Verb for example) – often considered language universals – constitute primitive units in any given language or cross-linguistically. He retains parts of speech only as labels for non-primitive elements within

constructions. Croft cites examples from languages which linguists have asserted lack one or more of these primitive categories (Quechua, Philippine, Iroquoian, for instance, Croft 2001: 65-75). Additionally, he cites examples from languages which linguists have asserted possess covert categories (Makah and Japanese, for instance, Croft 2001: 75-83) in addition to one or more of the traditionally accepted categories. With this evidence, Croft argues that positing universal parts of speech is difficult in many single languages, and these difficulties multiply cross-linguistically. Ultimately, Croft (2001: 105) concludes that a syntactic theory must abandon the notion of universal parts of speech: “Radical Construction Grammar accepts the verdict of distributional analysis and rejects the notion that parts of speech are global categories of particular language grammars, let alone categories of Universal Grammar. Instead language particular categories are construction-specific”.

Additionally, Radical Construction Grammar rejects the notions of universal syntactic roles, such as Subject, Object, etc., arguing, “The syntactic roles subject and object are not unified, uniform syntactic categories. Instead syntactic roles are construction-specific and thus syntactic and semantic accounts of syntactic roles are at a par” (Croft 2001: 133). Croft (2001: Chapter IV) argues that the cross-linguistic evidence does not support the idea of universal syntactic roles, noting, “[W]ithin a language, there are no categories defined by syntactic roles – independent of the constructions in which they occur. Instead, constructions are the primitive units of syntactic representation, and the categories they define distributionally are found in relations to each other defined in terms of their meaning or function” (2001: 170). For instance, Croft cites discrepancies in case-marking in “Accusative” versus “Ergative” languages as evidence for rejecting syntactic roles as

language universals, arguing that interpreting the case assignment in these languages requires semantic comparisons between the participant roles encoded in these languages.

Perhaps most radically, Radical Construction Grammar does not posit syntactic relations between the elements of any given construction. Croft represents syntactic relations between elements of a construction in Fig. 4.4 with a dotted line, because he acknowledges that other construction grammars posit such a relation. For Radical Construction Grammar, however: “The only internal syntactic structure to constructions is their *meronomic* or part-whole structure: the syntactic structure of constructions consists only of their elements (which may also be complex constructions) and the *roles* that they fulfill in the construction” (Croft 2001: 5). Croft argues that neither of the two overt sorts of evidence for syntactic relations between these elements – collocational dependencies and coded dependencies – constitute compelling evidence of syntactic relations. Croft defines a collocational dependency as “a constraint on the choice of a word in a sentence by another word or words in a sentence, as illustrated in (1):

(1) The cherry trees burst into bloom” (2001: 177).

Here *burst into* constrains the choice to *bloom* or *flower*. This sort of example is usually given as evidence of syntactic government. Croft notes that some examples of collocational dependencies are better described as semantic constraints than syntactic ones, and “[t]he fact that some collocational dependencies seem to be syntactic and others semantic poses a problem for their analysis” (Croft 2001: 177). Croft argues, following Nunberg *et al.* (1994), that collocational dependencies are one point on a continuum between expressions which are almost completely semantically compositional and expressions which are idiomatic (*spill the beans* meaning ‘divulge information’, for instance, as opposed to **spill the succotash*). Croft

agrees with Nunberg *et al.* that the conventionality of the idiomatic meaning of an expression is a semantic question. Meaning results from a symbolic relation between the elements and their conventional interpretation (see Fig. 4.4 for one illustration of how the internal structure might appear). If such dependencies are related to the semantics of the expression, then they do not serve as evidence of internal syntactic relations.

The other evidence for syntactic relations between elements is found in coded dependencies, which are the overt markings (agreement, case, linear order, etc.) generally taken to indicate the syntactic relations like constituency. The agreement of *sings* with a singular subject, *she*, is a coded dependency in *She sings*. This evidence proves inconclusive to Croft as well. Croft cites examples where these dependencies turn out to be unexpected: For example, some agreement morphemes in Ute that are not attached to the head, but to the first constituent in the clause and some agreement morphemes are not attached to any constituent (Croft 2001: 198-9). Additionally, Croft notes that these dependencies can be mismatched. Croft (2001: 199) notes:

“Some languages use a variety of overtly coded dependencies. In a construction grammar, the different types of coded dependencies in a single language are treated as different constructions. And since there are multiple criteria for establishing a putative syntactic relation in a language with multiple overtly coded dependencies, one might expect there to be mismatches, in languages as well as across languages. This is in fact what we find”.

One example of multiple coded dependencies is the Russian relative pronoun *kotoryj* ‘who(m), which’, which is inflected for number and gender to agree with its antecedent, but inflected for case based on its position in the dependent clause. Croft notes that tests for constituency should be taken to be construction-specific. Instead of regarding coded dependencies as evidence for syntactic relations, Croft (2001: 234) posits that overt coded dependencies are the result of the coding of symbolic relations of form to meaning, and notes

that “[c]ross-linguistically, coded dependencies tend to show up when the hearer needs them, and to be absent when the hearer does not need them”. He cites as an example some incidences of overt relational coding. For instance, the Rumanian Object Preposition *pe* appears “when the Object referent is most likely to be mistaken for the Subject referent, that is when it is human and/or definite” (Croft 2001: 234). Croft states that elements of a construction, while they have no independent syntactic relations to each other, are not set adrift. They remain syntactically related to the construction as a whole, defined by their syntactic roles.

Croft also argues that the denial of all of these previously considered universal categories and relations does not mean that there are no language universals. Instead he offers another alternative, one presented by the typological method. Although Radical Construction Grammar holds that all constructions are language-specific, their form-to-function mappings are not impossible to compare. Croft accepts the model of a conceptual space. Croft notes that the terms “mental map”, “cognitive map”, “semantic map” and “semantic space” have also been used to refer to conceptual space. Haspelmath (2003: 213) defines a semantic map as “a geometrical representation of functions in “conceptual/semantic space” that are linked by connecting lines and thus constitute a network. The configuration of functions shown by the map is claimed to be universal”.

Croft makes a distinction between a conceptual space – the network of related functions that constructions can represent – and a semantic map – the mapping of constructions onto that space. In short, the conceptual space represents the functional terrain a construction might cover and the functions performed by a given construction form the map of that construction onto the terrain.

Croft (2001: 97) states:

“The conceptual space model allows us to relate functional categories identifiable across languages...to their syntactic expression within particular languages... and the constructions used to express cross-cutting conceptual distinctions for those classes. The conceptual space represents a typologically valid language universal: a universal conceptual structure and universal constraint that syntactic categories (construction-specific and language-specific) are mapped onto conceptual categories that form connected regions in conceptual space”.

Croft believes that it is in these mappings of form to function that true universals of language may be found. The way a language expresses a given function or idea (the abstract notion of what we believe is a ‘noun’ for instance) is not universal across languages. However, a comparison of dozens of languages with different expressions for these functions begins to form a more complete picture of the range of functions associated with an expression. Haspelmath (2003: 212) gives an example: English uses the preposition *to* for several different semantic purposes. Four are listed below:

(41) English preposition *to*:

- | | |
|--|---------------|
| a. Goethe went <i>to</i> Leipzig as a student. | (direction) |
| b. Eve gave the apple <i>to</i> Adam. | (recipient) |
| c. This seems outrageous <i>to</i> me. | (experiencer) |
| d. I left the party early <i>to</i> get home in time | (purpose) |

We can begin to see what is universal cross-linguistically when we examine the set of possible mappings of form to function. A comparison of languages shows that *to* shares some of the functions of the dative in case-marking languages. The comparison of many languages also places those functions on a conceptual space. Their connection to each other on the map is determined by where languages use the same forms to express these functions. If a language uses the same form for a set of functions, those function must be contiguous in the conceptual space. Below is Haspelmath’s (2003: 213) map for typical dative functions, with the boundaries of English *to* imposed upon it:




Fig.4. 5: A semantic map of typical dative functions/the boundaries of English *to*

The role of the preposition *to* is not universal across languages. The language universals are found in the space of related dative functions. In Chapter VI, we will see that the form-*to*-function role of a *xomb*-construction serves to define the boundaries of a speaker's mental space. Other constructions – in Russian and in other languages – likely perform related functions. It is in the cross-linguistic comparison of these constructions that we gain insights about the conceptual space that represents how speakers define mental spaces.

The crucial advantage that a construction grammar provides is a framework that unites the syntactic and semantic roles of *xomb* into one symbolic role. To understand the symbolic role of *xomb*, we need to reassess the syntactic and semantic picture of the particle within the framework of a construction grammar in general and Radical Construction Grammar in particular: What problems does this new approach solve, and what issues does it raise?

In Chapter II we saw that *xomb* did not possess an obvious semantic profile. Authors who addressed the subject had to either posit several different meanings for the particle (Wade, Vasilyeva) or suggest that the particle's meaning was conditioned by its context (Zel'dovič). A construction grammar allows us to consider the particle as an element in a larger construction, one that contains *xomb* and its host word or phrase. In Chapter II, we also noted that *xomb* may be linked with many different kinds of constituents – nouns, verbs, adverbs, etc. Each combination of *xomb* with one of these elements can be viewed as a different

construction. Each *xoṃ*-construction exists within a taxonomic network of similar constructions. We must now address what role a *xoṃ*-construction plays semantically, syntactically and pragmatically. The framework of a construction grammar allows us to look for a unified symbolic role for the particle, rather than examining semantic and syntactic structures separately.

Another benefit of a construction grammar is that we can acknowledge that the construction exists as a whole in the minds of speakers: if the framework which is applicable to idiomaticity is applicable to all constructions, we are not obligated to decide if the idiomaticity is due to historical evolution. In Chapter II, we saw that a variety of historical antecedents have been suggested for *xoṃ*. Fillmore *et al.* (1988: 507) noted that *the* in the *X-er the Y-er* construction – of which *The bigger they are, the harder they fall* is an example – “has an instrumental demonstrative (Old English *þy*) as its source”. Recognizing this progression does not make the construction less idiomatic, as “[t]he existence of a diachronic relationship or a partial synchronic similarity between two constructions does not release the language learner from the obligation to acquire the construction as such” (1988: 507). The historical progression of *xoṃ* – while it may provide insight into the pragmatic and semantic character of the construction – does not necessarily suggest a syntactic role for the current instantiation of the particle. Speakers of Russian learn the particle *xoṃ* as they do everything else in a grammar, as an element in a family of related constructions.

Radical Construction Grammar does not include the premise of universal syntactic categories. Whether *xoṃ* can be deemed a clitic or not, the putative category of clitic is not a linguistic primitive in Croft’s formulation. What remains corresponds to the intuition of the authors cited in Chapter II: the particle *xoṃ* has meaning only in its attachment to a host

word or phrase. With the goal of treating the resulting construction as a syntactic and symbolic whole, we now turn to an examination of the symbolic role of *xomb* in an utterance. To understand the role of *xomb* in the construction in which it appears, we will need to address the way a speaker categorizes elements he encounters. I will discuss theories of categorization in Chapter V, as a background for a discussion of the role of *xomb*. In Chapter VI, I will discuss the role that *xomb* plays in the categorization of elements that it attaches to.

CHAPTER V

Cognitive Views of Categorization

To understand the pragmatic and semantic import of a *xom̃*-construction, one must understand the way speakers categorize their impressions of the world. Speakers categorize the elements and situations that are the subjects of their discourse. The particle *xom̃* implies that a speaker is making a judgment about the highlighted constituent, and evidence has shown that people do not categorize items in the straightforward way that classical models of categorization have long assumed that they do.

Zel'dovič claims that speakers use the particle *xom̃* in contexts referring to the likelihood, desirability, possibility, etc. of a situation, examined in reference to a range of other situations. He asserts that speakers are placing the element highlighted by *xom̃* at the extreme edge of a range of similar situations. This conclusion implies that speakers have ranked a series of situations in some way. Before we can understand what symbolic role *xom̃* plays in a construction, we need to understand how humans perform these rankings. To understand how speakers characterize what is extreme requires a discussion of how speakers categorize any variety of related elements.

Categorization

Classically speaking, a category seems well-defined. Membership in a category is based on a set of binary features, which an individual member may or may not possess. Croft & Cruse (2004: 76) note:

“The so-called classical model of conceptual categories defines them in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient features. The features are necessary in that no entity that does not possess the full set is a member of the category, and they are sufficient in that possession of all the features guarantees membership”.

The belief that a notion is semantically defined by a set of binary features is a long-standing theoretical tradition. Taylor (1989: 21-26) enumerates the implications of a the classical, feature-based approach. Below are a few of these conclusions:

- 1) Categories are defined in terms of a conjunction of necessary and sufficient features.
- 2) Features are binary
- 3) Categories have clear boundaries
- 4) All members of a category have equal status.

From the classical perspective, all members of a category possess the same necessary and sufficient features and should be equivalent exemplars of that category. However, recent research by cognitive scientists indicates that this model has serious flaws.

One of the most obvious flaws of a feature-based definition of category membership is that it brings no obvious cognitive advantage in the processing of decisions about membership. Taylor (1989: 35) points out that the classical definition of categories does very little in terms of an epistemological definition of the category or the individuals in it:

“Concretely, how do we know that entity e belongs to category C ? If category membership is defined by a conjunction of features $f_1...f_n$, the only way to know with certainty is to check the entity for each of the features $f_1...f_n$. But, then, knowledge that e belongs to C actually brings no benefits at all”.

Croft & Cruse (2004: 76-77) cite three additional flaws in the classical model of categorizations. Firstly, for some categories there are no clear-cut features that define membership. “[F]or many everyday concepts, as Wittgenstein pointed out with his well-

known example of GAME, adequate definitions in terms of necessary and sufficient features are simply not available”. They note that for some concepts – like *bachelor*, where the features seem well defined – the definition is only salient in certain contexts. To say that the Pope is a bachelor, for instance, is semantically strange at best. Secondly, Croft & Cruse point out that people sometimes judge items as ‘better’ or ‘more typical’ members of categories, countering the classical notion that all members are equivalent. Lastly, “the classical model can offer no account of why category boundaries, in practice, seem to be vague and variable” (Croft & Cruse 2004: 77).

Croft & Cruse’s second objection to the classical model – that speakers deem some members of categories more or less typical examples of the category – is perhaps the most problematic. Considerable experimental evidence supports this objection.

There has been a significant amount of research that indicates that people do not judge every exemplar in a category as equivalent to another. Much of this research began with categories whose members belonged to naturally graded sets, such as colors. In the color spectrum, red is considered to exist in a certain portion of the spectrum, but wavelength endpoints of red are not explicitly defined. These sorts of natural categories call into question just how humans define categories in general. In experiments, Berlin & Kay (1969) identified what they refer to as basic color terms. To be a basic color term, a word must have the following properties: a) It must be relatively simple morphologically (*red* as opposed to *reddish*). b) The color cannot be an instance of another color. For instance, Lakoff (1987: 25) states that *scarlet* is “contained” in *red*. c) The term cannot be restricted to the description of a limited number of items. Lakoff (1987: 25) gives the example of *blond*, which is restricted to hair, wood, and possibly a few other things. d) The word must be in

common usage. Berlin & Kay identified eleven terms which fit these criteria. They then discovered that subjects associated a specific color with each color term. This “focal color” was generally the same for all subjects, regardless of the language from which the color terms were drawn. “Basic color terms name basic color categories, whose central members are the same universally. For example, there is always a psychologically real category RED with focal red as the best, or ‘purest’, example” (Lakoff 1987: 25). Subjects asked to choose the best example of red from a selection of exemplars will choose focal red. Berlin & Kay discovered that while not all languages possess all of the basic color terms, speakers of those languages still choose one of the eleven focal colors, even for categories whose range encompasses two or more focal colors. Their choice is not a combination of those colors, but one of the focal colors covered. Lakoff summarizes (1987: 26): “The existence of focal categories shows that color categories are not **universal**. Some members of the category RED are better examples of the category than others. Focal red is the best example. Color categories have central members”.

The discovery of these effects in the categorization of natural categories led to the study of what Croft & Cruse (2004: 77) call “the notion of Goodness-of-Exemplar”. Cognitive scientists noted that categories showing these types of Goodness-of-Exemplar effects were not restricted to color. Rosch (1973: 329) notes:

“[M]any ‘real’ categories (concepts designable by words in ‘natural languages’) partition domains whose stimuli are not discrete but composed of continuous physical variations; natural language categories are not necessarily composed of combinations of simpler, already learned attributes; and in most, if not all, natural language concepts, some stimuli are clearly better exemplars of the concept than others”.

An obvious question for cognitive science is what role the perception of these stimuli play in the processing of information about the world. Rosch (1973: 329) notes that these

central members appear to play a role in ease of processing, “for subjects appear to operate inductively by abstracting a ‘prototype’ (a central tendency) of the distribution (e.g. of dot patterns, schematic face features), a ‘prototype’ which then appears to ‘operate’ in classification and recognition of instances”. Rosch performed experiments (1973) in which she taught color and shape terms to a culture that did not possess this terminology. The results reinforce her hypothesis that categories that have a focal member are easier to learn, that focal or prototypical members are learned first, and that subjects will tend to view members of that category as variations on a central member. She also notes the possibility that these effects might exist in categories beyond the classic natural ones (colors, shapes).

In short, the evidence which has been presented regarding the structure and learning of color and form categories may have implications beyond the domains of color and form: (a) there may be other domains which are organized which are organized into natural categories, and (b) even in nonperceptual domains, artificial prototypes (the best examples of nonperceptual categories) once developed may affect the learning and processing of categories in that domain in a manner similar to the effects of natural prototypes. (Rosch 1973: 349)

Rosch extended her research to what Barsalou (1983: 224) calls “common categories”, categories of common physical objects that demonstrate the same bias toward prototypical members found in natural categories. Lakoff notes (1987: 41): “[Rosch] developed other experimental paradigms for investigating categories of physical objects. In each case, asymmetries (called prototype effects) were found: subjects judged certain members of categories as being more representative of the category than other members”.

Prototype effects present a serious problem for the classical model of categorization. The subjects’ preference of one exemplar over another undermines the assumption that each member belongs in the category because of the same necessary and sufficient features.

The privileged status of one level of organization in the taxonomic network presents another challenge to the classical model. A taxonomic network is a system of classification – and a common model of linguistic knowledge – where each element is an instance of the one above it. Some levels are more salient than others. Lakoff (1987: 46) notes that cognitive scientists (Berlin 1974, Hunn 1977) have shown that “the level of biological genus is psychologically basic”, meaning that genus is the level in the biological taxonomy with which people are most likely to identify life forms. Lakoff adds that Rosch and others have shown that recognition of the most salient psychological levels extends to other kinds of taxonomic categories as well. Taylor (2002: 131) notes about Rosch’s experiments: “It generally turns out, however, that there is one level in a taxonomy which is particularly salient. This is the **basic level** – the level at which things are called unless there are good reasons to do otherwise”. This basic level is generally found in the middle of a taxonomic hierarchy. Lakoff’s example below illustrates the way this level fits in different levels with the taxonomic hierarchy (1987: 46):

(42) SUPERORDINATE	ANIMAL	FURNITURE
BASIC LEVEL	DOG	CHAIR
SUBORDINATE	RETRIEVER	ROCKER

The basic level includes members like DOG, CHAIR, TABLE, BIRD, etc. Several attributes distinguish these mid-level members as cognitively basic. Lakoff (1987: 46) notes that the basic level is “the highest level at which members have similarly perceived overall shapes”, “the highest level at which a single mental image can reflect the entire category”, “the level at which subjects are fastest at identifying category members”, and “the level at which most of our language is organized”. Other features determine this level as well,

including the fact that this level of the lexicon is the first acquired by children, and basic-level categorization is the first type of categorization at which children become proficient (Lakoff 1987: 48-9). The cognitive advantages and special status of the basic level indicate a complexity in the process of categorization not captured by the classical, feature-based model.

The discoveries of these challenges to the classical model led to a conception of a category as a group with a prototypical underlying mental representation. Other members of the category are judged in comparison to the prototype, and the membership within the category is graded accordingly. Although this view of categorization based on graded categories demonstrates more flexibility in assessing individual members, this model still suffers from flaws. Croft & Cruse (2004: 80-90) identify the problems with the view of a static prototype:

“A major criticism of the prototype model of category structure is that a simple feature list, even with the relaxation of the requirement that the features be necessary and sufficient, is far too simplistic... There are various aspects to this excessive simplicity. One is that it cannot handle context sensitivity. Studies have shown that what is chosen as the best example of a category can be influenced by indicating a context for the judgment (Barsalou 1987)”.

Another important issue is left unresolved in the static prototype model: The idea of the boundaries of categories. Boundaries are addressed rarely in the prototype model of categories, but as Croft & Cruse (2004: 89) note: “[A] boundary is arguably the most basic of all the properties of a category. A category is like a container: one of its major functions is to divide the objects in the world into those things that are in it and those things that are not in it. This function cannot be fulfilled without a boundary”. Addressing these shortcomings requires a model of categorization that is more flexible and sensitive to context. Croft & Cruse will call this model the dynamic construal approach. The idea that makes this approach

possible is the capability of speakers to view items against a perceived conceptual background. This semantic background has been referred to as a frame or domain and is the foundation of a more fluid model of categorization.

Croft & Cruse (2004: 16) acknowledge that “[t]he terms “frame” (Fillmore), “base” (Langacker), and “domain” (Fillmore, Lakoff, Langacker) all appear to identify the same theoretical framework”. A frame is a body of knowledge or a set of assumptions against which something is grounded cognitively. Lakoff (1987: 68) gives the example of days of the week: “*Tuesday* can be defined only relative to an idealized model that includes the natural cycle defined by the movement of the sun, the standard means of characterizing the end of one day and the beginning of the next, and the larger seven-day cycle – the week”. While this seems self-explanatory, Lakoff reminds his reader that the seven-day week is a human construct and, moreover, one that exists in only some cultures. Other conceptualizations of the demarcation of time exist.

Even without the idea of dynamic construal, one possible source of prototype effects might be the complex nature of the assumptions underlying a frame. Lakoff (1987: 70) cites Fillmore’s example of *bachelor* as “defined with respect to an idealized cognitive model (for which frames represent one structuring principle) in which there is a human society with (typically monogamous) marriage, and typical marriageable age”, but notes that this is an oversimplification of the assumptions that go into the assessment of a man as a bachelor. The model does not, for instance “fit the case of the Pope or people abandoned in the jungle, like Tarzan. In such cases, unmarried adult males are certainly not representative members of the category of bachelors” (Lakoff 1987: 70). The mismatch of the frame of the cognitive model with the cultural background assumptions of the world as we know it may give rise to

prototype effects: the Pope demonstrates a lesser degree of membership in the category of bachelor than a more prototypical member of the category. The idea that prototype effects result from this mismatch has at its heart the idea that categories have a static underlying prototype.

Croft & Cruse (2004: 92) state: “Most views on the nature of categories have had in common a belief in a constant underlying mental representation of some kind for each category”. However, Barsalou (1983) notes that prototype effects are found outside of the previously studied common categories. His research focuses on what he calls ad hoc categories, and he notes about these types of categories: “[T]he use of highly specialized and unusual sets of items pervades everyday living. Some examples are ‘things to take on a camping trip’, ‘possible costumes to wear to a Halloween party’, and ‘places to look for antique desks’” (Barsalou 1983: 211). Experimentally, Barsalou’s ad hoc categories demonstrate what he perceives as the three aspects of graded structure: 1) “some instances of a category are better examples than others”, 2) “the presence of unclear cases”, and 3) “non-members of the category (i.e., its complement) vary in how similar they are to the concept of the category” (Barsalou 1983: 221). Although ad hoc categories demonstrated fewer of the cognitive benefits associated with graded structures (easier retention in memory of members of the category, for instance), the fact that ad hoc categories share the same prototype effects with common categories indicates that subjects were able to form graded categories “on-line”, that is during the course of an exchange during which they were necessary. In an effort to explain why speakers might have this ability, Barsalou (1983: 226) posits: “In general, the construction and use of ad hoc categories appear to reflect creative aspects of human intelligence...Perceiving these new organizations may be necessary to achieving new goals

or to approaching old goals in novel ways”. The construction of an ad hoc category is associated with a specific goal, which can supply a frame against which the category is formed. Items are then eligible for membership in this dynamic category.

Smith and Samuelson (1997) propose that a more dynamic view of categorization is implied by results like Barsalou’s, namely “that categories are inherently variable, and created on-line as and when needed” (Croft & Cruse 2004: 93). They posit three types of elements out of which any concept is created: past history, recent history, and current input. Croft & Cruse (2004: 93) characterize this last element as “a construal of immediate context, including linguistic, perceptual, social, psychological aspects, including current goals and plans, inferences and expected outcomes, perceived causal relations and so on”. These three elements account for the flexibility of frames that provide a background for ad hoc categories. Barsalou argues that common categories may in fact represent well-entrenched instances of ad hoc categories. Common categories, whose cognitive advantages (easier retention, etc.) set them apart, may gain those advantages from frequency of reference, and not from privileged status as common categories. Many of the problematic aspects of the classical prototype model are more easily explained with the dynamic construal approach. Boundaries, for instance, might be evidence of variable construal, rather than any fuzziness of the category itself. For example, wild dogs are admissible in categories of DOG when dogs are discussed as mammals but are not admissible when dogs are discussed as pets. Croft & Cruse (2004: 95-6) also note that: “the type of variation shown by the category DOG in *dogs and other pets* and *Dogs are mammals* seems more convincingly explained by a modulation in the frame, rather than an adjustment in the degree of fit with a constant underlying DOG frame”.

Linguistically speaking, the possibility of constantly shifting frames makes sense: Discourse is an area of constantly varying construal, shifting common knowledge, complex social norms, and differing pragmatic goals. A framework already exists in which to discuss this flexibility – that of Fauconnier’s mental spaces.

Mental Spaces

The dynamic model suggests that categorization is the result of a process of construal. If the categorization of a situation is construed, then the meaning of an utterance (i.e. how it is categorized) is largely dependent on what a speaker or hearer believes and has construed about the context of the utterance. The utterance is not the carrier of meaning. The development of mental spaces results in part from this conclusion. Fauconnier (1985: xxiv) states: “Regardless of whether propositions play a role in semantic theory or natural language logic, *sentences are not carriers of propositions*”.¹⁶

Mental spaces serve to explain the construal of meaning within a given context. These spaces are:

“domains that we set up as we talk or listen, and that we structure with elements, roles, strategies, and relations. These domains – or interconnected mental spaces, as I shall call them – are not part of language itself, or of its grammars; they are not hidden levels of linguistic representation, but language does not come without them” (Fauconnier 1994: 1).

Often speakers designate a mental space by means of what Fauconnier calls a “spacebuilder”, for instance *Bob thinks, in this picture, I believe that, and in reality* all build mental spaces. An example is the mental space set up by *in this picture*. The utterance *In this picture, Lucia is twelve* does not indicate that Lucia is now twelve, that Lucia was ever twelve, or even that Lucia exists. If we assume that a painter had painted a series of pictures

¹⁶While Fauconnier’s mental spaces are especially elegant and compatible with a view of categorization that allows for graded membership, other frameworks, such as Kripke’s ‘possible worlds’ approach could support the complexities of reference that my conclusions require.

of a non-existent Lucia, then we might have a series of linked mental spaces (here pictures) in which there is a referent that does not have a counterpart in reality. Such referents present a problem for traditional semantics. Fauconnier (1994: 1-2) notes “Many problems of natural language ‘logic’ turn out to stem from features of mental space construction; examples given here include opacity, attributivity, intentional identity, presupposition projection, counterfactuals and comparatives”.

Lakoff (1987: 213) gives an example of a sentence that is “beyond classical systems of objectivist semantics”:

(43) If Ted Turner had been born twins, they would have had competing sports networks, but as things are, he has no competition.

For truth conditional semantics, the representation of Ted Turner as two individuals in another possible world is problematic. However, in a mental space framework of semantics, the fact that Ted Turner is one person in reality and two in the conditional mental space is not a problem. The situation might be represented thus:




Fig.5. 1: Ted Turner as twins in a mental space representation

Mental spaces remove a good deal of the complexity involved in truth-conditional calculations of reference. That complexity still needs to be represented. Fauconnier (1994: 2) addresses the question of where that representation might occur:

“To be sure, there is complexity somewhere, but the point here is that a good part of the load can (and should) be shifted from the intemporal language structures to the field of virtual and multiple mental constructions. What is complex for the linguist-observer may be much less so for the speaker-listener who is engaged in a single construction at a time, narrowly guided by context”.

Fauconnier notes that an overt spacebuilder is not always necessary or provided. The objects to which a speaker refers exist in a mental space – one that is characterized by his belief in it – as do his assertions about them. When referred to by a speaker, reality is itself a mental space. John Taylor (2002: 590) defines a mental space as:

“a conceived situation, populated with elements and relations between them. A mental space may be assumed to be veridical, that is, it is taken to be an accurate model of (some fragment of) reality. Mental spaces can also be hypothetical, fictional, counterfactual, or may represent the desires or hopes of a speaker”.

Mental spaces are compatible with the concept of frames discussed earlier in this chapter.

Fauconnier (1994: xxxix) notes:

“Two notions easily overlooked in traditional accounts of reference and grammar seem crucial: framing and point of view. Work in cognitive and construction grammar (Langacker, Talmy, Fillmore, Lakoff, Brugman, Goldberg) suggests that syntactic configurations are a means of accessing very general (and generic) frames, which in turn map on to more specified frames, via lexical specification, and that those frames in turn map on to even more specific ones determined by the local content, local space connections, and relevant cultural and background knowledge. Space building, in this respect, is also frame building. The frames provide the abstract-induced schemas that drive mapping across mental spaces. The discourse construction is highly fluid, dynamic, locally creative: Provisional categories are set up in appropriate spaces, temporary connections are established, new frames are created on line, meaning is negotiated”.

Mental spaces can be regarded as domains within a semantic network. Spaces represent categories with graded membership and prototype effects, and can be represented by a series of connected frames, illustrating the network of connected mental spaces making up the discourse situation. This understanding of how discourse might be modeled will give us an approach to *хотѣ* that begins to unify the fragmented picture in Chapter II, namely the

semantic domain of this Russian particle. In Chapter VI, we will see that the role of *хоть* is to identify the way a speaker has categorized a situation with respect to a relevant mental space: *хоть* identifies a situation as marginal with respect to the construed norm of a mental space.

CHAPTER VI

Xom̃ on the Boundary of a Category

In Chapter IV we saw that a construction grammar imposes the demand that the particle *xom̃* serve a unified pragmatic or symbolic role with respect to the other components in a *xom̃*-construction. The dynamic construal model of categorization discussed and Fauconnier's mental spaces discussed in Chapter V suggest an approach to *xom̃* that reveals the unified symbolic role of the particle: *Xom̃* signifies that its host element is a marginal member of a speaker's mental space based on a construed prototype. The authors (Vasilyeva, Wade, Zel'dovič, Lobanova & Slesareva) cited in Chapter II regarded *xom̃* as having at least one or two meanings that denote an extreme, a maximum or a minimum, and that idea is preserved in my formulation of the symbolic role of *xom̃*.

Zel'dovič suggests that the meaning of *xom̃* depends on context. The data I collected reveal that *xom̃* does function in several different contexts, but that in each one the particle fulfills the same symbolic role. In each context, *xom̃* attaches to an element of a sentence and indicates that element's position relative to the constructed mental space. Again, I will use the term "highlights" to denote this attachment. *Xom̃* places its highlighted constituent on the boundary of a mental space, for which the speaker has construed a prototype on-line.

Here is a graphical representation of such an utterance:




Fig.6. 1: Depiction of a model for a *хоть*-construction

An utterance that includes *хоть* *Y* indicates that the speaker construes *Y* as marginal member of the mental space defined by the circle above. While *Y* is still included in the space, it is on the boundary. As we look at examples we will see that *хоть* indicates the last possible situation that might still be included in a given speaker's mental space.

Zel'dovič's conclusion that *хоть* corresponds to an extreme is correct. Zel'dovič addresses only the function of *хоть* that he considers minimal: He suggests that *хоть* attaches to an element in the sentence that the speaker considers the minimal requirement, the last possible option that can be construed in any given context. For Zel'dovič this distinction is necessarily scalar. His contexts provide the axis along which a speaker judges each possibility. In his analysis of the example (44) below, the positive evaluation of the speaker is the scalar quality against which *Он позвонил* 'He called' is judged. Zel'dovič argues that this scalar quality operates in an axiological context, that is, one associated with the speaker's evaluation. The situation marked by *хоть* in this sentence, *Он позвонил* 'He called', is the

minimum point on that scalar axis that can be positively evaluated. The fact that the person called represents the minimal act that speaker will judge positively.

- (44) “Он **хотя бы** позвонил, а ты этого не сделал.”
 [He-N ХОТЯ БЫ call-p-s, and you-N that-G not do-p-s]
 ‘He **at least** called, and you didn’t do that.’
 (Zel’dovič 1991: 112)

As we saw in Chapter II, Zel’dovič asserts that the scalar axis along which situations are identified as minimal by *хоть* is determined by context. Zel’dovič’s formulation implies that each highlighted extreme must be the last possible option along a one-dimensional scalar path. The reason that Zel’dovič’s conception is not sufficient to describe all instances of *хоть* is that the particle need not highlight a situation as the unique extreme with respect to a scalar quantity. More than one option may be regarded as extreme. It is for this reason that *хоть* is often repeated in utterances, denoting more than one, not necessarily logically connected, extreme. In the example below, *хоть* highlights two possibilities as logical extremes of the oppression caused by sorrow: crying out and throwing oneself from the ninth floor. While these are both extreme in the mind of the speaker, they do not represent extremes along any one given scalar line:

- (45) Так я строил планы, придумывал, воображал и, можно сказать, мечтал — а время шло, и иногда тоска наваливалась такая, что **ХОТЬ** вой, **ХОТЬ** сам бросайся с девятого этажа.
 [So I-N construct-p-s plans-A, contrive-p-s, conceive-p-s and, able say-infin, dream-p-s – and time-N go-p-s, and sometimes sorrow-N bear on-p-s such-N, that ХОТЬ wail-impf, ХОТЬ myself-N throw oneself-impf from ninth-G floor-G.]
 ‘Thus I constructed plans, contrived, conceived, and, it might be said, dreamed – and time passed, and sometimes, such sorrow accumulated, that I **could have** wailed, **could even have** thrown myself from the ninth floor.’ (70)¹⁷

As we saw in Chapter II, Zel’dovič asserted that probability must play a role in assessing a situation as a minimal extreme, precisely because the situation must be noted as probable to

¹⁷The number that follows examples from my data set indicates the number of the example in Appendix 1.

merit comment from the speaker. If the mental space is construed on-line, as the dynamic construal model suggests, the logic of what is extreme need not overlap with what is probable. What is marginal is construed on-line as well.

The depiction of the particle as noting an extreme gives a more coherent picture of the seemingly disparate meanings enumerated by Wade and Vasilyeva as discussed in Chapter I. Two examples of such uses follow:

- (46) Кто из вас перенёс войны, **ХОТЬ** одну, тот знает, какие ужасы она несёт самым слабым.
[Who-N from you-G endure-p-s war-A, ХОТЬ one-A, that-N know-np-s, what-sort-of-A horror-A bring-np-s most-D weak-D.]
‘Those of you who have lived through wars, **even** one, know what horrors they spell for the weakest.’ (Vasilyeva 2002: 156)

Here, in Vasilyeva’s example *одну (войну)* ‘one (war)’ is the highlighted element. Vasilyeva (2002: 155) described this usage as “an affirmation or negation implying an antithesis with something extreme (maximal or minimal), the particle *хоть* fulfils an expressive-emphatic function”. There is an extreme implied: One war is the smallest number of wars that one might live through and have the knowledge that the speaker is assuming. Here, *хоть* highlights the number as the minimum requirement for this level of knowledge. This use of *хоть* is depicted in Fig.5.3 below. I have placed an arrow in the diagram to denote that the number of wars lends itself to a one-dimensional scalar implicature.




Fig.6. 2: Model for Number of Wars example

The following example indicates another logical extreme:

- (47) Клуб у нас новый отстроили. Сцена – **хоть** весь балет из Большого театра ставь!
 [Recreation center-M near we-G new-N build-p-pl – **XOTЬ** all-N ballet- from Bolshoi-G theater-G put-impf!]
 ‘They’ve built a new cultural center in our area. The stage **is such that you could** put the whole ballet from the Bolshoi there.’¹⁸

In this case, the whole Bolshoi ballet is, for the speaker, the logical extreme of what might be placed on a stage that large. The unspoken norm or prototype is construed on-line and involves what is intended to go on a cultural center stage. The speaker is delineating what he believes is possible. The possibility that the statement is hyperbolic is not problematic within the framework of mental spaces.

After collecting data I discovered that the mental spaces defined by *хоть* fall into several connected categories. I will discuss first the collection of the data, and then the picture that data produced about the typical contexts for a *хоть*-construction.

¹⁸As in Chapter 2, this translation is mine. Vasilyeva’s less literal translation: ‘They’ve built a new cultural center here. The stage is so enormous, it could even take the whole Bolshoi ballet.’

Methodology

In order to explore the meaning of *хоть*, I wanted to collect data that represented the full extent of *хоть*'s functions. I had two concerns. First, I wanted to make sure that the full range of syntactic categories were covered, i.e. that the highlighted element in a *хоть*-construction could be a noun phrase, a prepositional phrase, a finite verb, an infinitive, etc. Second, it was important to include all of the uses of *хоть* that Vasilyeva and Wade enumerated in their analysis of *хоть*.

In order to achieve this, a relatively large sample of occurrences of *хоть* was required. I used the Национальный корпус русского языка (Russian National Corpus: <http://www.ruscorpora.ru/>), which at that time contained 30 million words (it now contains 100 million). The Russian National Corpus was ideal in several ways. First, the texts included are taken from both fiction and nonfiction sources, and therefore cover a broad range of styles, from publicistic to colloquial, which was important given the colloquial nature of *хоть*. Second, the Corpus facilitates searches along syntactic parameters. For example, one can search for *хоть* and specify that a given part of speech (a noun, preposition, finite verb, etc.) appear adjacent to the search word, or specify that it follow the search word within a given number of words. Thus we might search for *хоть* and specify that a preposition follow within three words of *хоть*. This search returns about twelve thousand sentences, with a preposition appearing adjacent to *хоть*, or as one of the next three words. The Corpus also provides the option of showing an expanded context for each of the sentences provided.

I began by searching for *хоть* in contexts containing various parts of speech: nouns, adverbs, finite verbs, imperatives, quantifiers, and prepositions. I omitted adjectives, as they

were often included in the noun phrases that occurred in the *хоть* + noun combinations. I included imperatives specifically, because in idiomatic expressions *хоть* has a known preference for imperatives, and because Fužeron & Nikolaeva suggest that *хоть* itself is derived from an obsolete imperative. I wanted to be sure that *хоть* + imperative did not exhibit behavior different from other contexts involving verbs. Because the Corpus searches for words automatically based on morphological patterns in Russian, its results for a given part of speech occasionally turn up some other part of speech in error. For instance, a search for *хоть* + imperative also turned up *весь* ‘all’ as an imperative form, because Russian imperative forms often end in *-ь*. I weeded through these interlopers, and I was careful to include several of each syntactic type in my final data set. I usually selected the first twenty texts that provided relevant examples for each syntactic type, and therefore sometimes culled more than twenty examples, simply because each text sometimes included more than one instance of *хоть*.

From the resulting data set, which contained slightly over 140 examples, I removed duplications. For instance, *хоть* + quantifier and *хоть* + noun would likely both return the same example containing *хоть одним глазком* [XOTЬ one-I eye-I] ‘with just one eye’ and I kept only one of these examples. After making sure that I had enough of each syntactic type, and only one of each example, I checked to be sure that all of Vasilyeva’s uses of *хоть* were represented. I chose her interpretation because hers was by far the most comprehensive, with nine uses in all, including and exceeding the uses on Wade’s list.

With the help of the given context and occasionally with the help of a native speaker of Russian, I reread each example to make sure that there was sufficient context to identify the role of the particle in the sentence. There were many examples for which this was not the

case, even with extended context provided by the Russian National Corpus. Sometimes confusing storylines or references to a part of the story or article that could not be accessed simply precluded interpretation, and the data had to be removed. After verifying that all of Vasilyeva's meanings were still represented, I was ready to interpret my data set of 100 examples.

General types of mental spaces

In the final data set, four general contexts for the use of *xomb* became evident: 1) axiological contexts which deal with evaluation of a situation, 2) contexts that deal with knowledge and perception, 3) contexts that deal with logical possibility, and 4) exemplary contexts that use the particle to include a situation in an argument. In my analysis of the data, I will treat each of these contexts in turn. All of these contexts provide frames for the formation of the mental spaces that a speaker uses *xomb* to characterize.

In addition, the issue of negation that the data set raises will be addressed. If an element highlighted by *xomb* is on the boundary of a mental space, then the negation of a *xomb*-construction strongly negates that element's membership in the category provided by the mental space – negation suggests that the element does not have a place, even as a marginal member.

Lastly, as some instances of *xomb* in my data set are clearly conjunctions, I will discuss the role of *xomb* as a conjunction and the way in which its particulate function applies to its role as a concessive conjunction.

In my analysis of the data, all of the examples cited are from my data set (Appendix 1) unless otherwise noted.

Axiological Spaces

Axiological spaces are mental spaces concerned with how positively a situation is evaluated by the speaker. At stake in these instances is the speaker's construal of how a situation should be structured. A *хоть*-construction designates a situation on the boundary of what the speaker evaluates positively – as far from the prototype as possible – while still remaining in the mental space of positive evaluation. The prototype in these situations is often an ideal, and the examples presented by *хоть*-constructions are often viewed as minimally satisfactory, as Wade (1998: 522) notes. This usually means that the situation in a *хоть*-construction shares some feature of the prototype ideal.

In the following example (48), the ideal prototype for these speakers is the traditionally fulfilling resort experience. The situation referred to is still on the edge of the mental space of things positively evaluated, because having gas is a feature shared by *this* particular resort experience and the *ideal* resort experience.

- (48) Жители курорта утешают друг друга: «**ХОТЬ** газ есть».
[Residents-N resort-G console-np-pl friend-N friend-A “XOTЬ gas-N be-np-s”]
‘The residents of the resort console each other “**At least** there’s gas.”’ (11)

Examples where the speaker expresses satisfaction or at least the desirability of the fulfillment of a minimal requirement (Wade 1998: 522) are also common. In the example (49) below, a prototypical norm might be a lifetime of courage, and thus not being afraid once is seen as minimally satisfying.

- (49) Ну, скажи, ну **ХОТЬ** один раз в жизни не бойся.
[Well, say-imper, well XOTЬ one-A time-A in life-L not be afraid-impf]
‘Well, talk, well, **at least** once in your life don’t be afraid.’ (27)

In the following example, a prototypical norm around which the mental space is constructed is likely to be the ideal of a happy and devoted union. The hypothetical situation

in which the woman goes to a brothel is minimally satisfying when compared with the reality that speaker is addressing – the marriage of the woman the speaker loves. Drama is the feature emphasized as close enough to the norm to justify inclusion of the situation in the category.

- (50) Выходит замуж — в сравнении с подвижной, взволнованной нежностью, которой я ее окружал, о ней думал, ее ждал, с ней говорил — было чуть ли не в публичный дом, в каком-то смысле даже хуже, потому что там **хоть** драма, а здесь пошлость.
 [Marry-np-s – in comparison-L with changeable-I excitable-I tenderness-I, which-I I-N she-A encircle-p-s, about she-L think-p-s, she-A wait-p-s, with she-I speak-p-s – be-p-s a little whether not in public-A house-A, in some sort of-L sense-L even worse, because, there drama-N, and here banality-N.]
 ‘She is getting married – in comparison with the dynamic, excited tenderness with which I surrounded her, thought about her, waited for her, talked with her – it was almost like going to a brothel, in some sense even worse, because there was **at least** drama there, but here only banality.’ (20)

The axiological mental space is constructed around a speaker’s construed ideal. The examples of *хоть*-constructions in my data set that fell into this sort of mental space all represented situations that could be described as minimally positive in the speaker’s mind. All of these situations could be viewed as the least possible situations along a scalar axis of positive evaluation, leading to the following overall model of the category:




Fig.6. 3: Model for Axiological Contexts

All *хоть*-constructions in this category of the form *хоть Y* depict a situation *Y* as a minimum for positive evaluation. In these contexts as in all of the contexts I identified, *хоть* indicates that a situation is marginal with respect to a construed prototypical ideal. In this axiological context, the highlighted situation is identified as minimally satisfying with respect to the prototypical member of the category.

Perception/Knowledge

Here contexts come in two kinds of extremes: extremes of what information is known and extremes of how well that information is perceived. This category breaks down further into cases of understanding versus physical perception. Spaces concerned with perception and knowledge overlap with the axiological spaces in that speakers often evaluate knowledge and understanding positively, especially in the pragmatic context of an informative conversation. Minimal knowledge or perception can be construed as a minimal extreme in an axiological space where the idealized norm is full knowledge or perception.

Contexts that deal with what is known are almost always contexts where *хоть* highlights an element as marginal in a space where the expected norm (or even the ideal) is a more comprehensive or full knowledge of a situation.

- (51) И, внимательно взглянув на государыню, спросил: — Ты **хоть** знаешь, матушка, как Григорий-то умер?
 [And, attentively glance-verb.adv-p-s on lady-A, ask-p-s – you-N **ХОТЬ** know-np-s, mother-N, how Grigory-? die-p-s?]
 ‘And, having glanced attentively at the lady, he asked – You **at least** know, madam, how Grigory died?’ (52)

In this example, the speaker has designated the information regarding how Grigory died as the minimal knowledge that he is willing to assume. There is no indication here that more

knowledge would or would not be positively evaluated by this speaker – only that he seems to anticipate that she is likely to know this at minimum.

The following example is one in which there is an overlap with an axiological context. The speaker is not in possession of much information about the events facing him at the end of his trek. He does know one thing – how far they are going – and finds that information minimally satisfying in a space where more information, or even a full understanding, would constitute an ideal:

- (52) Но мы **хоть** знали докуда — до нашей бабки.
[But we-N **XOTЬ** know-p-pl how far – to our-G grandmother-G.]
'But we **at least** knew how far – to our grandmother's.' (51)

Knowledge is scalar in that it ranges in quantity from none to full understanding. Many examples in this category involve knowledge or perception as construed in discrete chunks, and a single chunk is highlighted as standing at the margin of understanding in a mental space representing possible perception. In example (53), one word is perceived as the least possible amount understood:

- (53) Ты **хоть** одно слово поняла?
[You-N **XOTЬ** one-A word-A understand-p?]
'Did you understand **even** one word?' (46)

In addition to knowledge and understanding, perception can be seen as quantifiable.

Seeing and hearing are often contexts where these constructions are present.

- (54) Случалось, степняки заезжали в поселенье, чтобы **хоть** поглазеть на лагерь.
[Happen-p-s, steppe people-N ride over-p-pl in settlement-A in order **XOTЬ** have a look-infin on camp-A.]
'It happened, that the steppe people rode over to the settlement in order to **just** have a look at the camp.' (49)

- (55) Так бы хотелось **хоть** одним глазком глянуть на храм этот великий.
[So CONDIT want-p **XOTЬ** one-I eye-I glance-infin on cathedral-A that-A great-A]
'How I would want to catch **just** a glimpse of that great cathedral.' (48)

In example (55) a glance caught with just one eye is a metonymical representation of a discrete chunk of perception. It is also possible in Russian to catch just one glance, or to hear something with just the edge of an ear. *Xomb* is often attached to such representations of minimal knowledge.

Data in this category is unambiguously of two types: either 1) the amount of knowledge possessed is highlighted as minimal against the desired, expected, or possible amount of knowledge, or 2) the perception of that knowledge is highlighted, often in discrete chunks, and metonymical representation of these chunks. The picture that best models this category, with an arrow indicating the scalar nature of the highlighted quality, follows:

Nothing known




Fig.6. 4: Model for Knowledge/Perception Contexts

In this category, as in the axiological context, *xomb* highlights a minimal situation with respect to the prototypical ideal. In this context, the amount or knowledge or perception is identified as on the margin of the speaker's mental space.

Logical possibility

In the category of logical probability, many axes of interpretation are possible. It is likely that a speaker believes that something is on the edge of possibility in several different ways, with or without considering a maximal or minimal interpretation with respect to any

particular scalar quality. Scalar qualities are also possible, and *хоть* can be found commonly highlighting one or both of the maximal/minimal interpretations of such qualities. The possibility of more than one highlighted quality leads to more complex examples that require comment.

A majority of the examples in this category highlight a logical extreme that is not associated with a scalar quality. In part, this tendency is so common because this is the context that includes most of the familiar idiomatic set phrases, such as *хоть отбавляй*, ‘to saturation’, ‘up to our necks’, or ‘more than you could shake a stick at’ and *хоть убей* ‘so help me’, or ‘to a fault’. In general, this tendency is manifested in statements of a hyperbolic nature, in which the speaker states that an extreme is possible, even if literally it is not. The mental space built in such an instance may not correspond to reality, but does indicate that the speaker has the pragmatic goal of extending the mental space to include a hyperbolic possibility. The use of an imperative may indicate a statement of a challenging nature – the assertion that nothing short of a hyperbolic extreme will do. The imperative in this case serves as an attempt to challenge the listener to accept an enlarged mental space. An example of the idiomatic construction *хоть отбавляй*:

(56) Лидеров, действительно, **ХОТЬ отбавляй**.

[Leaders-G, really, ХОТЬ pour off-impf.]

‘Really, we are **up to our eyeballs** in leaders.’ (68)

Отбавлять literally means to ‘pour off’, and the implication in the idiomatic phrase *хоть отбавляй* ‘to saturation’ is that there is enough of something that it cannot be diminished, even if one tried. This possibility is an extreme in a mental space where the prototypical norm would be a quantity of something that could be augmented or diminished.

Хоть убей ‘to a fault’, on the other hand, highlights killing as an extreme possibility (imperative *убей* ‘kill’). In example (57) the extreme circumstance in which the referent is submissive, even should you kill him, is represented as the most extreme case in a mental space where a more prototypical norm would include lack of submission.

- (57) Во всём покорность, **хоть убей**
 [In everything-P submission-N, **XOTЬ** kill-impf.]
 ‘In everything, submission, **to a fault.**’ (63)

In addition to common and idiomatic phrases, the particle is often used in this context to highlight one logical possibility. This might or might not include imperatives as the set phrases do, but almost always highlights a possibility that indicates the expansiveness of the mental representation:

- (58) Все знают из древних времен, что опущенного можно использовать как угодно, можно бить вволю, можно **хоть** есть ложкой, издеваться, и каждый вокруг может заставить его делать что хочешь.
 [All-N know-np-pl from ancient times-G that defeated-A might use-infin as wished might beat-infin as much as wanted might **XOTЬ** eat-infin spoon-I mock-infin and every-N around can-np-s force-infin he-A do-infin what-A want-np-s.]
 ‘Everyone knows from ancient times that one may use the downtrodden as one wishes, may beat him as much as one wishes, can **even** eat him with a spoon, mock, and everyone around can force him to do what you want.’ (65)

The possibility of eating someone with a spoon is extreme along an axis of what might be able to do to another. A construed prototype for this mental space might include being able to push someone around or call them names, but for this speaker, eating someone with a spoon designates a maximal possibility along the axis of possibilities. Both maximal and minimal examples along a given scalar quantity exist:

- (59) И растолкуй им, что, коли **хоть** одна душа узнает, — наказание беспощадное..
 [And drive home-impf them-D, if **XOTЬ** one-N soul-N find out-np-s – punishment-N ruthless...]
 ‘And drive home to them, that if **even** one soul finds out – the punishment will be ruthless...’ (71)

In this example, the number of people who may find something out is scalar, ranging from the highlighted minimum of one to potentially very many. The purpose of *хоть* in this example is to highlight that there will be a result, in this case negative, for even the minimal end of the scalar measure.

As it is possible to highlight one extreme of a scalar quantity, it is possible to highlight both extremes and many examples exhibit two *хоть*-constructions, one highlighting the minimal extreme and one the maximal extreme. In the following example the extremes are the minimal and maximal number of parents that might write the same child on their passport (one and two, respectively):

- (60) Ребенок до 14 лет может не иметь собственного заграничного паспорта, а быть вписанным в выданный паспорт родителя (**хоть** одного, **хоть** обоих).
 [Child-N to 14-G year-G can-np-s not have-infin own foreign passport-G, but be-infin written-I in issued passport-A parent-G (**XOTЬ** one-G, **XOTЬ** both-G)]
 ‘A child up to 14 years old does not have to have his own passport for foreign travel but may be written into the passport issued to a parent (**either** one, **or even** both).’ (76)

This use of two *хоть*-constructions can exist even when the scalar quality is less quantitative. In this case the scalar quantity along which the maximum and minimum vary is passion:

- (61) Пусть ее подцепит **хоть** страстный грек, **хоть** сдержанный скандинав — Медведев ревновать не будет.
 [Let she-A pick up-np **XOTЬ** passionate-N Greek-N **XOTЬ** reserved-N Scandinavian-N – Medvedev be jealous-infin not be-fut.]
 ‘Let **either** a passionate Greek **or** a reserved Scandinavian pick her up – Medvedev won’t be jealous.’ (69)

The use of a *хоть*-construction to highlight multiple extremes along the same axis often appears in cases in which either highlighted option is perceived as an equal extreme. The

example from earlier in this chapter demonstrates the tendency to highlight extremes perceived as equally far from a prototypical norm:

- (62) Так я строил планы, придумывал, воображал и, можно сказать, мечтал — а время шло, и иногда тоска наваливалась такая, что **ХОТЬ** вой, **ХОТЬ** сам бросайся с девятого этажа.
[So I-N construct-p-s plans-A, contrive-p-s, conceive-p-s and, able say-infin, dream-p-s – and time-N go-p-s, and sometimes sorrow-N bear on-p-s such-N, that ХОТЬ wail-impf, ХОТЬ myself-N throw oneself-impf from ninth-G floor-G.]
‘Thus I constructed plans, contrived, conceived, and, it might be said, dreamed – and time passes, and sometimes, such sorrow bore down, that I **could have** wailed, **could even have** thrown myself from the ninth floor.’ (70)

The tendency of a *хоть*-construction to highlight equally perceived extremes can be further generalized to situations in which all members are conceived of as equivalent, in which *хоть* can receive the interpretation ‘either...or’:

- (63) Кого ты видишь как свое племя, будь они **ХОТЬ** голландцы, **ХОТЬ** индонезийцы — и есть «люди».
[who-A you-N see-np-s as one’s own-A tribe-A, be-impf they-N ХОТЬ Dutchmen-N ХОТЬ Indonesians-N – and be-infin ‘people’-N]
‘Whoever you see as your own tribe, **be they** Dutchmen **or** Indonesians – these are “people”.’ (75)

The argument that *хоть* serves to define a boundary of a speaker’s mental space gives a more unified meaning for *хоть* in the context of logical possibility in which both maximal and minimal extremes are possible. The particle highlights a situation as marginal to a given prototypical ideal – of what is most likely or possible. *Хоть* admits the highlighted situation to the margin of a mental space defined by the speaker’s conception of logical possibility or probability.

The exemplary meaning

As we have noted in Chapter II, Vasilyeva indicates that an example highlighted by *хоть* is not a marginal example in the speaker’s mind, but in fact the particle serves to emphasize the ease with which the speaker has found the example. Native speakers of Russian whom I

have asked about this share Vasilyeva's intuition. Therefore, an utterance like (64) indicates that the speaker does not see anything marginal about the nature of the carpenter as an example:

- (64) Возьмем, например, **хоть** простого плотника.
[Take-np-pl, for instance, ХОТЬ simple carpenter-A]
'We will take, for instance, **say**, a simple carpenter. (82)

The picture of this usage may appear to be quite different from the other contexts:




Fig.6. 5: Possible Exemplary Model

There is no reason to assume, however, that this context does not possess the same quality that the others do: the highlighted situation is a minimal or maximal extreme. I propose the following interpretation.

An easily found example still represents an extreme in the mental space of the speaker: If the mental space in question is “possible examples to provide to an interlocutor”, rather than “possible examples to consider”, the best and most obvious example is a maximal extreme. The axis along which the situations vary is the acceptability or goodness of a possible example. The highlighted situation is the optimal example. The pragmatic purpose of providing the best possible example is clear – a good example may win someone over to the speaker's point of view.

(65) Не говоря о французах, которые имеют репутацию хвастунишек, —
 возьмите других, **хоть**, например, скромных немцев.
 [Not speak-verb-adv about French-L, who-N have-np-pl reputation-A braggarts-G
 – take-imper others-A, **ХОТЬ** for instance, modest-A Germans-A.]
 ‘Not speaking of the French, who have a reputation as braggarts – take others,
take at least for instance, the modest Germans.’

In this example, the author Dobroljubov argues that Russians of his day do not compare favorably to any other nation’s peoples. The author acknowledges that the French may not be acceptable as a comparison because of their reputation as braggarts. The better example, that of the modest Germans, is an optimal example along an axis where the goodness of the example is rated along the scale of modesty. In this context *хоть* serves to highlight an extreme, here an optimal example, within the context of possible examples.

Negation.

As the use of a *хоть*-construction already indicates a case being highlighted as marginal, a *хоть*-construction negated or challenged represents an example strongly in the complement – that is, the area excluded – of a mental space. Negated *хоть*-constructions indicate that the speaker is incapable of accepting that a situation belongs in the proposed mental space, and therefore a strong rejection of such a situation within the context of the mental space is highlighted. A picture of the speaker’s representation of the situation with respect to the mental space might look like this:




Fig.6. 6: Model for negation of a *хоть*-construction

The following example of a challenge to a *хоть*-construction provides this interpretation:

- (66) Но, если честно, вы знаете **ХОТЬ** одну счастливую пару, чьи будни не омрачают ссоры, споры, конфликты?
 [But, if honestly, you-N know-np-pl ХОТЬ one-A pair-A, whose-A everyday life-A not darken-np-pl quarrels-N, disputes-N, conflicts-N?]
 ‘But, if you’re honest, do you know **even** one happy pair, whose everyday life is not darkened by quarrels, disputes, conflicts?’ (89)

In this instance the happy pair is not an acceptable member of the speaker’s mental space.

The speaker’s conception of relationships does not allow the possibility of a happy couple.

However, the visual representation in Fig.6.6 fails to represent one of the chief pragmatic purposes of *хоть*: negated *хоть* serves not only to exclude a possibility from a construed mental space, but also to negate a mental space domain along a construed axis. In the following example we see that what is being excluded is not only a possibility, but a space itself:

(67) Потому что американец не подозревает, что может существовать **хоть** одна хорошая планета, где нет благотворного американского влияния.
 [Because American-N not suspect-np-s, that can-np-s exist-infin **XOTЬ** one good planet-N where not beneficial American influence-G.]
 ‘Because the American doesn’t suspect that there might exist **even** one good planet where there’s not the beneficial American influence.’ (88)

Let us propose that this speaker is construing a scalar implicature along the axis of “number of good planets with American influence”. Such an implicature might be represented as follows:



Fig.6. 7: Scalar implicature of number of planets

The number of planets possible can be construed as unchanging, and the mental space of the American can be imposed upon the scalar implicature:




Fig.6. 8: Negation as a space imposed on a scalar implicature

No matter what is marginal for the American, the possibility of one good planet is excluded as his space does not contain it – the negation refers to the possibility of a space that includes the *one good planet*, not to the position of the planet along the scalar implicature.

The formulation that potential spaces are negated – not just situations – gives the same sense of strong exclusion. However, it responds to a pragmatic truth: When speakers negate a possibility, they are just as likely to be negating a point of view – a mental space – as they are to be addressing a given situation out of context.

The negation of a *хоть*-construction serves two purposes. First, negating a *хоть*-construction indicates the strong exclusion of a possibility from a mental space; such negation indicates that speaker is unwilling to view that possibility as even marginal to a construed space. Second, because mental spaces are often pragmatically related to one another, the negation of a possibility included in a space can serve as a negation of the space itself. This second interpretation of a *хоть*-construction points to one of the important qualities of these constructions in general: by demonstrating what is extreme in any one given category (what is evaluated as marginally positive, possible, etc.) a speaker demonstrates where his boundary for this category lies.

Conjunctions

As expected, *хоть* appeared in my data set as a shortened form of the conjunction *хотя*. The data indicated that it is possible to generalize the particulate use of a *хоть*-construction to the use of the conjunction. In a construction grammar approach, there is no reason that the syntactic element that *хоть* highlights should affect the overall symbolic role of the particle.

The data support the interpretation that *хоть* continues to highlight a marginal instantiation in a mental space.

The sentences that include *хоть* share a common thread: In each instance, the clause in the *хоть*-construction represents an unexpected element in the situation that the sentence depicts. The prototypical norm around which a mental space is formed is what one might expect from the independent clause in the sentence. Let us look at one example:

- (68) **Хоть** он и уверяет, что был влюблен семнадцать раз, но мне кажется, что он никогда не любил и не может любить.
[XOTЬ he-N and assure-np-s, that be-p-s in love-past-p-part seventeen-A times-G, but I-D seem-np-s, that he-N never not love-p-s and not be able-np-s love-infin.]
‘And **much as** he claims that he’s been in love seventeen times, it seems to me that he’s never loved and is unable to love.’ (98)

Here the assertion that this man has never been in love, and is incapable of love, might cause a speaker to construe a prototypical situation in which the man’s demeanor reflects the inability. Therefore, his claim that he has been in love seventeen times deviates from the construed prototype. The man’s assertion that he’s been in love many times is highlighted by *хоть* as the non-prototypical feature in a mental space with the main clause – *он никогда не любил и не может любить* ‘he’s never loved and is unable to love’ – as a frame against which the depended clause is assessed.

In example (69) the desire of the actor to not become hysterical is depicted as the non-prototypical feature against the frame evoked by *он не стерпел и надрывно закричал* ‘he didn’t endure it, and began screaming hysterically’. Here again, the clause with *хоть* suggests the marginal nature of this feature with respect to the picture as construed from the rest of the sentence.

(69) Скоро он не стерпел, **хоть** хотел казаться отдельным, и надрывно закричал.
 [Soon he-N not endure-p-s, **XOTЬ** want-p-s seem-infin detached-I, and
 hysterically begin to scream-p-s.]
 ‘Soon he couldn’t endure it, **although** he wanted to seem detached, and began
 screaming hysterically.’ (94)

While *хоть* has the translation ‘although’ in its conjunctive use, its symbolic role remains the same as *хоть* in its particulate contexts.

The conjunctive use of *хоть* shares the qualities that all *хоть*-constructions possess. In all of the contexts I have examined, a *хоть*-construction identifies a situation as marginal with respect to a construed prototype. In the axiological context, a situation is viewed as marginally positive with respect to a prototypical ideal. In the context of knowledge and perception, some quantity of knowledge is viewed as marginal to a space where the construed norm is full or expected knowledge of a situation. In the context of logical possibility, *хоть* highlights a situation as an extreme possibility with respect to a norm of probability or possibility in a given space. In the exemplary context, *хоть* highlights another sort of logical extreme: a best example. A negation or strong challenge to a *хоть*-construction reflects the speaker’s assessment that a space which contains the highlighted element is not possible – he cannot conceive of a mental space which includes that possibility as marginally within its boundary. Finally, the conjunctive use of *хоть* highlights a non-prototypical element and deems that the non-prototypical element in the dependent clause is still part of the space construed around the information in the independent clause. The role of *хоть* – to include a situation as marginal within a construed space – is the symbolic role that defines the particle within a *хоть*-construction.

Structure of a *хоть*-construction:

Having identified a symbolic role for *хоть*, I will return to the depiction of the construction itself. Let us look again at Croft’s expanded version of a construction:




Fig.6. 9: Expanded view of a *xomb*-construction

It is now possible to depict a *xomb*-construction of this form given our knowledge about the symbolic role of a particle in a *xomb*-construction:




Fig.6. 10 : Structure of a *xomb*-construction

In Fig.6.10, we see the two components of a *xomb*-construction: the particle and the element it attaches to. I have borrowed Klavans's convention of denoting attachment with the symbol =, although no formal syntactic relation between elements of a construction is necessary in Radical Construction Grammar. The symbolic role we have identified for *xomb* is to indicate the marginality of an element Y, giving a semantic interpretation of "indicator of marginality" for the particle as a component. Overall, the semantic reading of the combination of *xomb* and Y is at the bottom: Situation Y is marginal to the relevant mental space.

Fig.6.10 is a depiction of the general form of a *xomb*-construction. Because a *xomb*-construction might involve a number of different sorts of attached elements, this depiction is at the top of a taxonomy of possible *xomb*-constructions. A partial depiction of the family follows:




Fig.6. 11: Family of *хоть*-constructions

This depiction can be expanded to include all of the grammatical categories that we find in attachment to *хоть*. Here only the verbs have been continued to an incomplete second level. What is important in any depiction of a family of *хоть*-constructions is that the symbolic role of the particle does not change. The grammatical structure that represents the marginal situation may vary, but the combination of the *хоть* element and the element Y are syntactically and semantically inseparable in use. What is relevant in the mind of the speaker is the symbolic role of the combination.

As we have seen, several ideas from cognitive science allow us to form a more unified picture of the Russian particle *хоть*. The idea of graded category membership makes a Goodness-of-Exemplar judgment possible. This concept allows us to accept that a speaker may judge an individual member of a category as marginal. The possibility that these categories may be constructed on-line, the dynamic construal approach, along with

Fauconnier's framework of mental space, allow for the interpretation of individual, possibly variable mental spaces. Speakers use *xomb* to outline boundaries of these mental spaces for their interlocutors.

As an inspection of my data set had shown, several contexts for mental spaces appear in context with the use of this particle: axiological contexts, contexts associated with knowledge and perception, and contexts associated with examples included into arguments. These contexts are by no means discrete. Discourse functions flow naturally from one context into the next, but the function of a *xomb*-construction remains constant: to delineate the boundary of a mental space for a listener. This function is extended to the conjunction *xomb*, which denotes that a speaker perceives an aspect of a situation as marginal, although the situation is included in a given mental space.

CHAPTER VII

Conclusion

In Chapter II we noted that *xoṃ* does not appear to have a unified meaning. Authors like Vasilyeva and Wade attempt to treat subsets of the particle's meanings, while Zel'dovič based his treatment of *xoṃ* on the different contexts in which the particle appears. Both approaches fail to capture a single, unified meaning for *xoṃ*.

Syntactically, *xoṃ* seems equally mysterious. The syntactic category of clitics was established to encompass words that are not affixes but are unable to stand alone. *Xoṃ* is such a word. However, the syntactic category of clitics is difficult to define precisely. While there is significant evidence that *xoṃ* might be a clitic, the particle's membership in this syntactic class does not provide a means of addressing fundamental semantic questions: What role does *xoṃ* play in the sentence? Why do speakers employ it so frequently?

A more fruitful approach to the particle is found in the framework of a construction grammar. A framework of this type proposes that syntactic and semantic relations are not independent, but that their combination forms a unified symbolic role. In a construction grammar framework, the question is no longer about what part of speech the particle is or what features does its meaning possess, but rather: What is the particle's symbolic role in a construction?

The question of the particle's symbolic role becomes meaningful against the backdrop of cognitive theories of categorization. Since Berlin & Kay (1969) identified focal color terms and Rosch (1973) investigated the way in which subjects categorize natural and common

categories, cognitive scientists like Barsalou (1983) have shown that categories with graded membership represent a norm of categorization, a process that takes place on-line within a variety of contexts. Fauconnier's idea of mental spaces allows linguists to apply these ideas to the shifting frames of discourse. These spaces can represent values, beliefs, and assertions of the speaker. In a discourse context these spaces serve as frames against which a speaker categorizes situations. The role that *xomb* plays in an utterance relates directly to this form of categorization. A *xomb*-construction identifies situations that are marginal members of a speaker's mental space, and in so doing qualifies the position of the boundary of the space itself.

The mental spaces that serve as contexts for *xomb*-constructions fall into four overall categories: axiological spaces, spaces associated with knowledge and perception, spaces associated with logical possibility, and spaces concerned with examples in argument structures. In each of these categories, a *xomb*-construction identifies a situation that is marginal with respect to a construed prototype. For axiological spaces, *xomb* denotes a situation that is marginally acceptable. *Xomb* used in contexts of knowledge and perception indicate that a highlighted situation is one of a minimal amount of knowledge or perception with respect to a construed prototype of full or expected knowledge. In contexts of logical possibility or probability, the highlighted situation represents a logical extreme, either maximal or minimal along a given scalar axis. In exemplary contexts, a situation highlighted by *xomb* generally is the optimal example in the mind of the speaker. Necessarily a negation of a *xomb*-construction reflects the speaker's assessment that a space which contains the highlighted element is not possible – he cannot conceive of a mental space which includes that possibility as marginally within its boundary. That *xomb* appears in these contexts is not

surprising: These are often contexts in which it is pragmatically important for a speaker to demonstrate where a boundary is. What is at the edge of positive evaluation? How much do speakers and listeners know or perceive about a given situation? What is logically possible in a given situation? What example might change a listener's mind? The desire to express to a listener where the boundary of a mental space falls is congruent with the idea that discourse is a negotiation of such boundaries.

APPENDIX

Data Set

Key:

N – nominative

G – genitive

D – dative

A – accusative

L – locative

I – instrumental

p – past

np – non-past

fut – future (for forms of ‘to be’)

s – singular

pl – plural

imper – imperative

infin – infinitive

pres-p-part – present passive participle

past-p-part – past passive participle

pres-a-part – present active participle

past-a-part – past active participle

verb-adv – verbal adverb, gerund

INDEF – indefinite particle

CONDIT – conditional particle

EMPH – emphatic particle

INTERROG – interrogative particle

Axiological Contexts:

1. Три года я не входил в операционную и был рад **хоть** постоять в ней в стороне.

[Three-A year-G I-N not go in-p-s in operating room-A and be-p-s glad-N **XOTЬ** stand-infin in it-L in side-L]

‘For three years I didn’t go into the operating room and I was glad **just** to get to stand in it off to one side.’

2. Проиграешь три минуты, не больше, а я **хоть** волноваться не буду.

[Concede-np-s three-A minute-G, not more, and I-N **XOTЬ** worry-infin not be-fut]

‘You will lose three minutes, not more, and **at least** I won’t be worrying.’

3. Вы, стражи закона, уж если довели человека до инфаркта, то **хоть** помогите его донести до «скорой», — процедила сквозь зубы Людмила.
[“You-N, guardian-N law-Gsg, already if drive-to-p-pl person-A to heart attack-G, then XOTЬ help-imper carry-to-infin he-A to ambulance-G”, filter-p-s through tooth-A Lyudmila-N]
“If you guardians of the law have already driven a person to a heart attack, then **at least** help to carry him to the ambulance” Lyudmila snarled.’
4. Раньше **хоть** меценаты, ценители какие-то были!
[Earlier, XOTЬ art-patron-N, judge-N sort-of-INDEF-N be-p-pl.]
‘Before there were **at least** some sorts of patrons of the arts, judges!’
5. Могу я, наконец, **хоть** раз в жизни выпить спокойно!
[Be able-np-s I-N, finally, XOTЬ time-A in life-L drink-infin peacefully!]
‘Can I, finally, **just** one time in my life have a drink in peace!’
6. Ну, **хоть** жалость-то в тебе осталась?
[Well XOTЬ compassion-INDEF-N in you-L remain-p-s?]
‘Well, has **any** sort of compassion remained in you?’
7. Многочасовой сон ему уже и не нужен, глаза бы **хоть** сомкнуть, но нет, пустое бдение затянулось, это ясно.
[Many-houred-N sleep-N he-D already not necessary-N, eye-A CONDIR XOTЬ rest-infin, but not, empty-N vigil-N stretch out-p-s, that-N clear-N.]
‘He doesn’t need many hours of sleep anymore, **just** to close his eyes, but no, an empty wakefulness dragged on, that is clear.’
8. Я сделал все необходимое, чтоб **хоть** после смерти не принадлежать к нему.
[I-N do-p-s everything-A necessary-A, in order XOTЬ after death-G not belong to-infin to he-D.]
‘I did everything necessary, in order to **at least** after death not belong to him.’
9. Подожди, я **хоть** валерьянку найду!
[Wait-imper, I-N XOTЬ valerian-A find-np-s!]
‘Wait, I’ll **at least** find the valerian!’
10. Несколько раз Поль собирался с духом, чтобы сказать ей **хоть** слово, нарушить надсадное удушливое молчание.
[Few time-G Paul gather-p-s with courage-I, in order say-infin she-D XOTЬ word-A, break-infin heavy-A, stifling-A silence-A.]
‘A few times Paul gathered his courage in order to say **just** a word to her to break the heavy, stifling silence.’
11. Жители курорта утешают друг друга: «**хоть** газ есть».
[Residents-N resort-G console-np-pl friend-N friend-A “XOTЬ gas-N be-np-s”]
‘The residents of the resort console each other “**At least** there’s gas”.’

12. Он хотел приласкать ее, **хоть** обнять, но даже во тьме было заметно, что руки у него грязные, а если не руки — испачкает одежда, а ведь она, Настя, была чистенькая в сереньком своем платке.

[He-N want-p-s caress-infin she-A, **ХОТЬ** embrace-infin, but even in darkness-L be-p-s noticeable, that hand-N near he-G filthy-N, or if not hand-N – to soil-np-s clothing-N, and indeed, she-N, Nastya-N, be-p-s clean-N in gray-L own-L scarf-L.]

‘He wanted to caress her, **at least** embrace her, but even in the darkness it was noticeable that his hands were filthy, and if not his hands, his clothing will soil her, and indeed, she, Nastya, was spotless in her gray scarf.’

13. Смеялся, но и не знал, как было ему вырваться, выйти или **хоть** выползти из этих паутинных, уже не сталинских времен — как?

[Laugh-p-s but and not know-p-s, how be-p-s he-D escape-infin, walk-away-infin, or **ХОТЬ** crawl-away-infin from this-G spiderlike-G already not Stalinist-G time-G – how?]

‘He laughed, but knew not, how he would be able to escape, to walk away, **even** to crawl away from the spidery, post-Stalinist times. – How?’

14. Ему уже ничего не хотелось, только погреться бы, напоили бы **хоть** чаем...

[He-D already nothing-G not want-p-s, only warm up-infin CONDIT give-to-drink-p-pl CONDIT **ХОТЬ** tea-I...]

‘He didn’t want anything anymore, only to warm up a little, that he would be given **at least** tea...’

15. Наш врач сказал, когда я пришел, что, если останусь до вечера, Зоя может съездить домой, чтобы **хоть** переодеться.

[Our-N doctor-N say-p-s, when I-N arrive-p-s, that if stay-np-s until evening-G, Zoya be able-np-s take-a-trip-infin home, in order **ХОТЬ** change-clothes-infin.]

‘Our doctor said, when I arrived, that if I stayed until evening, Zoya might take a trip home, to **at least** change clothes.’

16. Наоборот, как только он закрыл за ней дверцу, она тут же прильнула к окну и стала заглядывать в его высокое лицо, стараясь **хоть** запомнить черты, нос, рот..

[On the contrary, how only he-N close-p-s after she-I door-A, she-N there EMPH cling-p-s to window-D and began-p-s peer-infin in his-A high-A face-A, try-verb.adv. **ХОТЬ** memorize-infin features-A nose-A mouth-A...]

‘On the contrary, as soon as he closed the door after her, she clung there to the window and began to peer into his high face, trying **at least** the commit to memory his features, his nose, mouth...’

17. А однажды, приняв в грудь кило шрапнели, истекающим кровью, исшрамленным, явился бы на глаза любимой, чтобы **хоть** увечьями тронуть камень ее сердца.

[And one day, receive-verb-adv in chest-A kilogram-A shrapnel-G, flowing out-pres-a-part blood-I scarred-I, turn-up-p-m on eye-A beloved-G, in order XOTЬ injury-I touch-infin stone-A her-G heart-G.]

‘And one day, having received a kilogram of shrapnel in the chest, he would want to turn up before of his beloved’s eyes, blood flowing, scarred, to touch, **at least** with his injuries, the stone of her heart.’

18. Он пришел, все сожрал и спать лег, ни спасибо, девочки, ни **хоть** посидеть с нами.

[He-N arrive-p-s, everything-A eat-up-p-s sleep-infin lie-down-p-s, neither thank you, girls-N, nor XOTЬ sit-a-little-infin with we-I.]

‘He arrived, ate up everything, and lay down to sleep, neither saying thanks, girls, nor **even so much** as to sitting a bit with us.’

19. Это мне брат посоветовал после смерти мамы лечь в больницу, все равно лежишь, там будешь лежать, там тебя будут **хоть** кормить.

[This-A I-D brother-N advise-p-s after death-G mother-G lie-infin in hospital-A, everything-N equal-N lie-np-s, there be-fut lie-infin, there you-A be-fut XOTЬ feed-infin.]

‘My brother advised me this after the death of our mother, to go to the hospital, [saying] you’re laid up anyway, if you’re there, there they will **at least** feed you.’

20. Выходит замуж — в сравнении с подвижной, взволнованной нежностью, которой я ее окружал, о ней думал, ее ждал, с ней говорил — было чуть ли не в публичный дом, в каком-то смысле даже хуже, потому что там **хоть** драма, а здесь пошлость.

[Marry-np-s – in comparison-L with changeable-I excitable-I tenderness-I, which-I I-N she-A encircle-p-s, about she-L think-p-s, she-A wait-p-s, with she-I speak-p-s – be-p-s a little whether not in public-A house-A, in some sort of-L sense-L even worse, because, there drama-N, and here banality-N.]

‘She is getting married – in comparison with the dynamic, excited tenderness with which I surrounded her, thought about her, waited for her, talked with her – it was almost like going to a brothel, in some sense even worse, because there was **at least** drama there, but here only banality.’

21. Тот подошел к нему и ударил по одной, потом по другой щеке наотмашь, а Матюшин и руки поднять не мог, от костылей оторваться, чтоб **хоть** укрыться.

[That-N approach-p-s toward he-D and along one-D, later along other-D cheek-D backhand, and Matyushin and arms-A lift-infin not be able-p-s, from crutches-G tear away-infin, in order XOTЬ take refuge-infin.]

‘That one came up to him and struck him first on one cheek and then backhanded on the other, and Matyushin wasn’t able to lift his hands, or let go of the crutches so that he could **at least** take refuge.’

22. И мы устроили свою жизнь так, чтобы **хоть** раз в неделю кто-нибудь его навещал.
[And we-N construct-p-pl own-A life-A such, in order XOTЬ time-A in week-A someone-
INDEF-N he-A visit-p.]

‘And we constructed our lives in such a way that someone **at least** once a week visited him.’

23. Она считала, что хозяйке и ее подруге живется плохо: «...А Анна Андреевна сперва **хоть** жужжала, а теперь не жужжит.

[She-N consider-p-s that landlady-D and her-D friend-D live-np-s badly “And Anna Andreevna at first XOTЬ buzz-p-s, but now not buzz-np-s.]

‘She considered that the landlady and her friend were living poorly “And Anna Andreevna at first **at least** buzzed, but now doesn’t buzz.”’

24. Заполучить **хоть** один текст, написанный рукой Эраста, — чтобы оправдать форму рассказа от первого лица в «Участи» — так и не удалось.

[Wrangle-infin XOTЬ one-N text-N, write-past.p.part-N hand-I Erast-G – in order to authorize-infin form-A story-G from first-G face-G in ‘Fate-L’ – so and not manage-p-s.]

‘The wrangle **even** one text, written in Erast’s hand – in order to authenticate the form of the first-person narrative in *Fate* – this much has not been accomplished.’

25. Четко работает редакция — ну и что? А Рахатов? Вон как Андрей вокруг него заплясал... Мог бы отстегнуть от этого расположения **хоть** кусок для Женечки. Не догадывается? Конечно, у него компьютер внутри, который и руководит деловой активностью, не обременяя совесть. И компьютер-то примитивный, советский.

[Precisely work-np-s editorial staff – well and what-N? And Rakhatov? There how Andrei-N around he-G begin to dance-p-s ... Be able-p-s CONDIT unfasten-infin from this-G situation-G XOTЬ bit-A for Zhenechka-G. Not guess-np-s? Of course, near he-G computer-N inside, which-N and manage-np-s business-I activity-I, not encumber-verb-adv conscience-N. And computer-N primitve-N Soviet-N.]

‘The editorial staff do their work precisely – and so? But Rakhatov? Look how Andrei began to dance around him... He could detach from this situation **just** a bit for Zhenechka. He guesses not? Of course, he has a computer inside, unburdened by conscience. And this computer is primitive, Soviet.’

26. Возьми **хоть** каплю бульона!

[Take-imper XOTЬ drop-A boullion-G]

‘Take **just** a drop of boullion!’

27. Ну, скажи, ну **хоть** один раз в жизни не бойся.

[Well, say-imper, well XOTЬ one-A time-A in life-L not be afraid-imper]

‘Well, speak, well, **at least** once in your life don’t be afraid.’

28. Она подумала (специально для него) вот что: Но если бы кто-нибудь, хоть один человек любил меня, то его страх за меня сейчас спас бы нас (меня и мое тело).
[She-N thought-p-s (specially for he-G) there that: But if CONDIT someone-N, ХОТЬ one-N person-N, love-p-s I-A, then his-N fear-N for I-A now save-p-s CONDIT we-A (I-A and my-A body-A).]

‘She thought, (specially for him) this: ‘But if someone, **just** one person loved me, then his fear for me now would save us (me and my body).’

29. Слава Богу, **хоть** одно знакомое лицо!
[Glory-N God-D, ХОТЬ one-N familiar-N face-N!]
‘Thank God, **at least** one familiar face!’

30. Ты просишь сиротливо: **хоть** на минуточку..
[You-N ask-np-s lonely: ХОТЬ on minute-A]
‘You ask in a lonely way: **just** for a minute...’

31. Поэтому в те времена, когда деятельной Евгешки подолгу не оказывалось дома, когда Аннушка отдыхала от жизни еще не так окончательно и нуждалась иной раз **хоть** с кем-то слово сказать (а ее «радива», уже тогда безмолвное, служило подставкой для чайника), — она терпеливо дожидалась меня на нашей кухне, где я появлялась крайне редко, обнаруживая ее сидящей на низком широком подоконнике, в ночной рубашке

[Therefore in those-A times-A. when active-I Evgeshi-N long not turn out-p-s at home, when Annushka-N relax-p-s from life-G still not so definitely and need-p-s another-A time-A ХОТЬ with someone-I word-A say-infin (and she-G “radiva”, already then silent-N, serve-p-s stand-I for tea kettle-G) – she-N patiently wait-p-s I-A on our-P kitchen-L, where I-N appear-p-s extremely rarely, discover-verb-adv she-A sit-pres.a.part on low-L wide-L window sill-L in night-L shirt-L.]

‘Therefore in those days when Evgeshi was busy and didn’t turn up at home for a long time, when Annushka took a rest from life still not so definitively and needed sometimes **at least** someone to say a word to (and her ‘radiva’ then already silent, serving as a stand for the kettle) – she patiently waited for me in our kitchen, where I appeared extremely rarely, discovering her sitting on the low wide window-sill in a night shirt.’

32. «Доктор, **хоть** одно слово: ей легче?» — «Да **хоть** два слова, — сердито ответила Нелли Петровна, — раз уж вы вынудили меня открыть дверь: нормально, жизнь девочки вне опасности».

[“Doctor-N, ХОТЬ one-N word-N: she-D better?” – “Yes ХОТЬ two-N word-G” – angrily answer-p-s Nelli Petrovna-N – “time-A already you-N force-p-pl I-A open-infin door-A: fine, life-N girl-G outside danger-L”]

“Doctor, **just a** word: is she better?” – “Yes, **even** two words”, answered Nelli Petrovna angrily, “Now that you’ve forced me to open the door: Fine, the girl’s life is out of danger.”

33. Кстати, ты **хоть** почитываешь мои статьи?
[By the way, you-N ХОТЬ read-a-little-np-s my-A articles-?]
‘By the way, are you **at least** reading my articles now and then?’

34. Помогалова уговорили, чтобы он отпустил **хоть** одного человека, конфеток прикупить да и за сигаретами, иначе выходило еще сутки ждать
[Pomogalov-A persuade-p-pl, in order he-N let go-p-s ХОТЬ one-A person-A, candy-G buy-infin yes and for cigarette-I, otherwise go out-p-s still day-A wait-infin]
‘They persuaded Pomogalov to let **at least** one person go, to buy some candy, even in exchange for cigarettes, otherwise it would be necessary to wait another day.’
35. У нее теперь была комната в трехкомнатной квартире, две другие заперты: хозяева зарабатывали в Египте сертификатные рубли. Она сказала: давай одну откроем, я знаю, где ключи, а когда приедут, как-нибудь договорюсь; чтобы из нас один **хоть** мог высыпаться.
[Near she-G now be-p-s room-N in three-room-L apartment-L, two-N other-A locked-past-p-part: landlords-N earn-p-pl in Egypt-L certification-A rubles-A. She-N say-p-s: give-imper one-A open-np-pl, I-N know-np-s, where keys-N, and when come-np-pl, somehow come to an agreement-np-s, in order from we-G one ХОТЬ be able-p-s get enough sleep-infin.]
‘At that point she had a room in a three-room apartment, two rooms were locked up: the landlords were earning certification money in Egypt. She said, let’s open one, so that one of us **at least** can get a good night’s sleep. I know where the keys are and when they return I’ll come to an agreement somehow.’
36. Слушай, ты не можешь со своими поговорить, чтоб меня-то **хоть** пропустили?
[Listen-impf, you-N not be able-np-s with one’s own-I talk-infin, in order me-A ХОТЬ pass over-p-pl?]
‘Listen, can’t you talk with your people, so that they would **at least** let me in?’
37. «Ты живой **хоть**?» — позвал он, и капитан проснулся.
[“You-N alive-N ХОТЬ” – call-p-s he-N and captain-N wake-p-s.]
““Are you **even** alive?” – he called and the captain awoke.’
38. **Хоть** замолчал, слава богу..
[ХОТЬ fall silent-p-s, glory-N God-D...]
‘**At least** he’s shut up, thank God...’
39. Ну и хорошо, **хоть** тело отдохнуло.
[Well and good, ХОТЬ body-N rest-p-s.]
‘Well and it’s good, **at least** the body’s rested.’
40. Тем не менее под конец он **хоть** похвалил автора за то, что тот «пишет, что хочет и как хочет».
[Nevertheless under end-A he ХОТЬ commend-p-s author-A for that, what that one-N “write-np-s, what-N want-np-s and how want-np-s”]
‘Nevertheless, in the end he **at least** commended the author that he “writes what and how he wants”.’

41. Деньги, **хоть** на карманные расходы, были между тем нужны, а взять их было неоткуда.

[Money-N ХОТЬ on pocket-A expenses-A, be-p-pl in the meantime necessary-N, get-infin they-A be-p-s from nowhere.]

‘Money, **at least** for out-of-pocket expenses, was necessary in the meantime, and there was nowhere to get it.’

42. Может быть, **хоть** страх за собственную жизнь сможет их заставить задуматься.

[Be able-np-s be-infin, ХОТЬ fear-N for own-A life-A be able-np-s they-A force-infin ponder.]

‘Maybe, **at least** fear for their lives will be able to force them to think things over.’

43. Мы считаем исключительно важным **хоть** частично помочь малообеспеченным семьям, матерям, детям.

[We-N consider-np-pl especially important-I ХОТЬ in part help-infin low-income-D families-D, mothers-D, children-D.]

‘We consider it especially important to, **at least** in part, help the low-income families, mothers, children.’

44. И всегда Бог ответит: если **хоть** немножко можешь поверить, то все возможно.

[And always God-N answer-np-s: if ХОТЬ a little bit be able-np-s believe-infin, then everything-N possible-N.]

‘And God will always answer: if you are able to believe, **even** a little, then everything is possible.’

45. Господи, если Ты ничего не можешь сделать, **хоть** не спи, **хоть** помучься с нами!

[God, if you-N nothing-A not be able-np-s do-infin, ХОТЬ not sleep-infin, ХОТЬ suffer-infin with we-I.]

‘God, if you can do nothing, **at least** don’t sleep, **at least** suffer with us!’

Knowledge and Perception:

46. Ты **хоть** одно слово поняла?

[You-N ХОТЬ one-A word-A understand-p?]

‘Did you understand even one word?’

47. Шапка-невидимка, значит? — переспросила я мальчика, который неуклонно продвигался задом наперед в мою жизнь. — А если такая уж она невидимка, пусть **хоть** одним глазком подсмострит, что сейчас предельвает девочка Наташа Самсонова из 1 «А»?

[Hat-invisible-N, means-np-s? – ask-again-p-sg I-N boy-A, which-N unswervingly move-forward-p-s backwards to-front in my-A life-A. – And if such-N already she-N invisible-N, let **XOTЬ** one-I eye-I

peep-np-s, that now play-np-s girl-N Natasha-N Samonova-N from 1A-G?]

‘Hat of invisibility, eh? – I again asked the boy, who was unswervingly moving backwards through my life. – But if it really is so invisible, then let it have **just** a look at what the girl Nastasha Samsonova from first grade, section A is now doing?’

48. Так бы хотелось **хоть** одним глазком глянуть на храм этот великий.

[So CONDIT want-p-s **XOTЬ** one-I eye-I glance-infin on cathedral-A that-A great-A]

‘How I would want to glimpse that great cathedral with **even** one eye.’

49. Случалось, степняки заезжали в поселенье, чтобы **хоть** поглазеть на лагерь.

[Happen-p-s, steppe people ride-over-p-pl in settlement-A in order **XOTЬ** have a look-infin on camp-A.]

‘It happened, that the steppe people rode over to the settlement in order to **just** have a look at the camp.’

50. Но ты **хоть** знаешь, например, что я написал... и о тебе?

[But you-N **XOTЬ** know-np-s, for example, that I-N write-p-s...and about you-L?]

‘But you **at least** know, for example, that I wrote...about you too?’

51. Но мы **хоть** знали докуда — до нашей бабки.

[But we-N **XOTЬ** know-p-pl how far – to our-G grandmother-G.]

‘But we **at least** knew how far – to our grandmother’s.’

52. И, внимательно взглянув на государыню, спросил: — Ты **хоть** знаешь, матушка, как Григорий-то умер?

[And, attentively glance-verb.adv-p-s on lady-A, ask-p-s – you-N **XOTЬ** know-np-s, madam-N, how Grigory-INDEF-N die-p-s?]

‘And, having glanced attentively at the lady, he asked – You **at least** know, madam, how Grigory died?’

53. И я говорю — нежно: «Ты **хоть** вспомнил тот берег?» А он смотрит, как на идиотку.

[And I-N say-np-s – tenderly: “You-N recall-p-s that-A shore-A?” And he-N look-at-np-s, as on idiot-A.]

And I say, tenderly: “You **at least** recalled that shore?” But he looks at me, as though at an idiot.’

54. И ты преспокойно слушала какую-то музыку, швырнув в меня эту книгу?! Ты **хоть** знаешь, что ты швырнула?

[And you-N very peacefully listen-p-s some sort of-A music-A fling-past.act.p in I-A this-A book-A? You-N **ХОТЬ** know-np-s, what-A you-N fling-p-s?]

‘And you were very peacefully listening to some sort of music, having flung this book at me? Do you **even** know what you threw?’

55. Знаешь, когда наконец твой немчуря приедет, я **хоть** увижу его, я **хоть** узнаю, кто тебя сделал такой спесивой.

[Know-np-s, when finally your-N German-N (disparaging) come-np-s, I-N **ХОТЬ** see-np-s he-A, I-N **ХОТЬ** find out-np-s, who-N you-A make-p-s so-I uppity-I.]

‘You know, when your square-headed German finally arrives, I’ll **at least** see him, I’ll **at least** find out, who has made you so uppity.’

Logical Possibility:

56. Неделю он не ходит, две не ходит, я лежу, другим цветы, подношения, мне ничего, продукты мать покойная носила, а я не ем, лежу и слушаю, может, забьется **хоть** одно сердце?

[Week-A he-N not walk-np-s, two-A not walk-np-s, I-N lie-np-s, other-D flowers-A, tributes-A, I-D nothing-N groceries-A mother-N calm carry-p-s, and I-N not eat-np-s, lie-np-s and listen-np-s, be able-np-s, beat-np-s **ХОТЬ** one-N heart-N?]

‘For a week he doesn’t come, for two he doesn’t come, I am lying there, the calm mother carried flowers to others, tributes, nothing for me, groceries, but I don’t eat, I am lying and listening, maybe, **at least** one heart will begin to beat.’

57. Надоело мне это! — А сам в то же время писал ей длиннейшие философические письма, из благодарности за которые бедная Мариэтта, конечно, готова была **хоть** замерзнуть.

[Annoy-p-s I-D this-N! – And myself-N in that-A EMPH time-A write-p-s she-D longest-A philosophical-A letters-A, from gratitude-G for which-A poor-N Marietta-N of course, ready-N be-p-s **ХОТЬ** freeze-infin.]

‘I’m sick of it! – And I myself at the very same time wrote her the longest philosophical letters, from gratitude for which poor Marietta, of course, was ready to **even** freeze.’

58. Я рад все переменить, **хоть** испортить — только не сходиться с ним».

[I-N happy-N everything-A change-infin **ХОТЬ** spoil-infin – only not meet with-infin with him-I]

I am happy to change everything, **even** spoil everything, only not to meet with him.’

59. Характеристику дам — **хоть** в академики иди; скажи только куда.

[Testimony-A give-np-s – **ХОТЬ** in academician go-imper; say-imper only to where.]

‘I’ll give testimony – **even** go to the academics; just say where.’

60. Музыки на бульваре — **хоть отбавляй**.

[Music-G on boulevard-L – ХОТЬ diminish-imper.]

‘Music on the boulevard – **we’re up to our eyeballs** in it.’

61. Господи, да **хоть** сегодня.

[Goodness gracious, yes, ХОТЬ today.]

‘Oh Lord, **even** today.’

62. Сын моей соседки, по ее словам, не реагирует, в чем ходит мать, **хоть** обнаженная!

[Son-N my-G neighbor-G, along she-G word-D, not react-np-s, in what-P walk-np-s mother-N, ХОТЬ naked-N!]

‘My neighbor’s son, in her words, doesn’t react to what his mother is wearing, **even** if she’s naked!’

63. Во всём покорность, **хоть убей**

[In everything-L submission-N, ХОТЬ kill-imper.]

‘In everything, submission, to a fault.’

64. В юности-то я ведь тоже не отличался воздержанностью, и ошибок было **хоть отбавляй**, но, ей-богу, я умел сам на себя набрасывать узду и не приносить в жертву суе то, что я считал самым главным в жизни — искусство.

[In youth-L I-N surely also not differ-p-s abstinence-I, and mistakes-G be-p-s ХОТЬ diminish-imper, but she-D-God-D, I-N knew-p-s myself-N on myself-A throw on-infin rein-A and not bring-infin in victim-A fuss-D that, what I-N consider-p-s most-I central-I in life-L – art-A.]

‘In youth I surely wasn’t remarkable in abstinence, and I was **up to my eyeballs** in mistakes, but as God is my witness, I knew how to throw the reins on myself and not sacrifice to the fuss the thing that I considered most central in life – art.’

65. Все знают из древних времен, что опущенного можно использовать как угодно, можно бить вволю, можно **хоть** есть ложкой, издеваться, и каждый вокруг может заставить его делать что хочешь.

[All-N know-np-pl from ancient-G times-G that defeated-A might use-infin as wished might beat-infin as much as wanted might ХОТЬ eat-infin spoon-I mock-infin and every-N around can-np-s force-infin he-A do-infin what-A want-np-s.]

‘Everyone knows from ancient times that one may use a downtrodden person as one wishes, may beat him as much as one wishes, **even** eat him with a spoon, mock, and everyone around can force him to do what you want.’

66. А вот о чем был этот эпизод — **хоть убей** не помню, да и содержание картины тоже.

[And there about what-L be-p-s that-N episode – ХОТЬ kill-imper not remember-np-s, yes and upkeep-N painting-G also.]

‘And what that episode was about – **for the life of me**, I don’t remember, and what was in the picture, too.’

67. Материалу было **хоть отбавляй**.

[Material-G be-p-s ХОТЬ diminish-imper.]

‘There was material **to saturation**.’

68. Лидеров, действительно, **хоть отбавляй**.

[Leaders-G, really, ХОТЬ diminish-imper.]

‘Really, **we are up to our eyeballs** in leaders.’

69. Пусть ее подцепит **хоть** страстный грек, **хоть** сдержанный скандинав — Медведев ревновать не будет.

[Let she-A pick up-np ХОТЬ passionate-N Greek-N ХОТЬ reserved-N Scandinavian-N – Medvedev be-jealous-infin not be-fut.]

‘Let **either** a passionate Greek **or** a reserved Scandinavian pick her up – Medvedev won’t be jealous.’

70. Так я строил планы, придумывал, воображал и, можно сказать, мечтал — а время шло, и иногда тоска наваливалась такая, что **хоть** вой, **хоть** сам бросайся с девятого этажа.

[So I-N construct-p-s plans-A, contrive-p-s, conceive-p-s and, able say-infin, dream-p-s – and time-N go-p-s, and sometimes sorrow-N bear on-p-s such-N, that ХОТЬ wail-imper, ХОТЬ myself-N throw oneself-imper from ninth-G floor-G.]

‘Thus I constructed plans, contrived, conceived, and, it might be said, dreamed – and time passed, and sometimes, such sorrow accumulated, that I **could have** wailed, **could even have** thrown myself from the ninth floor.’

71. И растолкуй им, что, коли **хоть** одна душа узнает, — наказание беспощадное..

[And drive-home-imper them-D, if ХОТЬ one-N soul-N find-out-np-s – punishment-N ruthless-N...]

‘And drive home to them, that if **even** one soul finds out – the punishment will be ruthless...’

72. — Я верю, что в каждом человеке, без исключения, — продолжал исповедоваться Саша, чувствуя непривычный прилив энергии, — в Достоевском, в старухе-процентщице, в Никите, в тебе, во мне, есть внутренний космос, назови его **хоть** душой, **хоть** духом.

[I-N believe-np-s, that in every-L person-L without exception-G – continue-p-s confess-infin Sasha, feel-verb.adv unfamiliar-A rush-A energy-G – in Dostoevsky-L in old-woman-moneylender-L, in Nikita-L in you-L, in I-L be-infin inner-N universe-N, call-imper he-A ХОТЬ soul-I ХОТЬ spirit-I.]

‘I believe that in every person, without exception – Sasha continued to confess, feeling an unfamiliar rush of energy – in Dostoevsky, in the old moneylender, in Nikita, in you, in me, there’s an inner universe, **call it** soul **or** spirit.’

73. У Куйбышевской больницы забоялся бесстрашный чекист, понял, что эти стилиаги, фашисты и сионисты с московским номером пойдут **хоть** на таран, а не отцепятся.
[Near Kuibyshev-G hospital-G, begin to fear-p-s fearless-N Chekist-N, understand-p-s, that these-N “hepcat”-N, fascist-N and, Zionist-N with Moscow-I number-I will come XOTЬ on battering-ram-A and not back off-np-pl.]

‘Near Kuibyshev hospital, the fearless Chekist began to be afraid, understood, that these “hepcats”, fascists, and Zionists with a Moscow hotel room will come, **even** to meet a battering-ram and will not back off.’

74. Сено посохло худо и пахло теплой прелью, **хоть** суши заново.
[Hay-N dry out-p-s poorly and smell-p-s warm-I mold-I, XOTЬ dry-imper over again.]
‘The hay dried out poorly, and smelled of warm mold, **you almost want to dry** it out again.’

75. Кого ты видишь как свое племя, будь они **хоть** голландцы, **хоть** индонезийцы — и есть «люди».

[Who-A you-N see-np-s as one’s own-A tribe-A, be-imper they-N XOTЬ Dutchmen-N XOTЬ Indonesians-N – and be-infin ‘people’-N]
‘Whoever you see as your own tribe, be they **either** Dutchmen **or** Indonesians – these are “people”.’

76. Ребенок до 14 лет может не иметь собственного заграничного паспорта, а быть вписанным в выданный паспорт родителя (**хоть** одного, **хоть** обоих).
[Child-N to 14-G year-G can-np-s not have-infin own-G foreign-G passport-G, but be-infin written-past-p-part in issued-past-p-part passport-A parent-G (XOTЬ one-G, XOTЬ both-G).
‘A child up to 14 years old does not have to have his own passport for foreign travel but may be written into the passport issued to a parent (**either** one, **or even** both).’

77. И ещё: человек, который **хоть** немного уважает район, в котором он живёт, не может быть равнодушным.
[And still: person-N, who-N XOTЬ somewhat respect-np-s region-A, in which-L he-N live-np-s, not be able-np-s be-infin indifferent-I.]
‘And still: a person, who **even** somewhat respects the region in which he lives, cannot be indifferent.’

78. Теперь уж ты никого не обманешь и не напугаешь, **хоть** лопни от злости!
[Now already you-N no one-A not deceive-np-s and not frighten-np-s, XOTЬ burst-imper from spite-G!]
‘Nowadays you don’t deceive or frighten anyone anymore, **though you might** burst from spite!’

79. Но **хоть** бы кто-нибудь из аппарата президента обратил на наш город внимание!
[But XOTЬ CONDIR who-INDEF from administration-G president-G turn-p-s on our-A city-A attention-A!]
‘**Would that** someone from the president’s administration would pay our city some attention!’

Exemplary/Inclusion into Argument:

80. Верите ли вы в **хоть** символических противников Путина на президентских выборах?

[Believe-np-pl INTERROG you-N in ХОТЬ symbolic-A opponents-A Putin-G on presidential-L elections-L]

‘Do you believe in **at least** symbolic opponents for Putin in the presidential elections?’

81. **Хоть** моего патрона возьмите, **хоть** Эраста.

[ХОТЬ my-A patron-A take-imper, ХОТЬ Erast-A.]

‘**Take for instance** my patron, **for instance** Erast.’

82. Возьмем, например, **хоть** простого плотника.

[Take-np-pl, for instance, ХОТЬ simple-Acarpenter-A]

‘We will take, for instance, **say**, a simple carpenter.’

83. Возьмем для примера **хоть** сегодняшний день.

[Take-np-pl for example-G ХОТЬ today-A day-A.]

‘Let’s take, for example, today.’

84. Возьмем для примера **хоть** тему "восход солнца" — что такое восход солнца?

[Take-np-pl for example-G ХОТЬ topic-A “rise-N sun-G” – what such-N rise-N sun-G?]

Let’s take for example the topic “sunrise” – what exactly is sunrise?

85. Не говоря о французах, которые имеют репутацию хвастунишек, — возьмите других, **хоть**, например, скромных немцев.

[Not speak-verb-adv about French-L, who-N have-np-pl reputation-A braggarts-G – take-imper others-A, ХОТЬ for instance, modest-A Germans-A.]

‘Not speaking of the French, who have a reputation as braggarts – take others, **take at least** for instance, the modest Germans.’

Negation:

86. Мне не хватает времени, чтобы просто подумать **хоть** одну минуточку.

[I-D not suffice-np-s time-G, in order simply think-infin ХОТЬ one-A minute-A’]

‘I don’t have time to simply think for **even** one minute.’

87. Ну неужели не найдется на целую страну **хоть** один, всего один тип... которому нужна любительница стихов и природы.

[Well surely not not be found-np-s on whole-A country-A ХОТЬ one-N, all-G one-N specimen...which-D necessary-N amateur-N poetry-G and nature-G.]

‘Well surely it’s not true that there can’t be found in this whole country **even** one, just one person...who needs a lover of poetry and nature.’

88. Потому что американец не подозревает, что может существовать **хоть** одна хорошая планета, где нет благотворного американского влияния.
[Because American-N not suspect-np-s, that be-able-np-s exist-infin **ХОТЬ** one-N good-N planet-N where not beneficial-G American-G influence-G.]
'Because an American doesn't suspect that there might exist **even** one good planet where there's no beneficial American influence.'

89. Но, если честно, вы знаете **хоть** одну счастливую пару, чьи будни не омрачают ссоры, споры, конфликты?
[But, if honestly, you-N know-np-pl **ХОТЬ** one-A pair-A, whose-A everyday life-A not darken-np-pl quarrels-N, disputes-N, conflicts-N?]
'But, honestly, do you know **even** one happy pair, whose everyday life is not darkened by quarrels, disputes, conflicts?'

90. Логика его поведения не может быть **хоть** сколько-нибудь предсказуема.
[Logic his-G behavior-G not be able-np-s be-infin **ХОТЬ** how much-INDEF predict-pres-p-part.]
'The logic of his behavior isn't **at all** predictable.'

91. Неужели мы не заслужили право **хоть** на малость внимания от государства?
[Surely not we-N not earn-p-pl right-A **ХОТЬ** on trifle-A attention-G from government-G?]
'Have we not earned the right **even** to a stitch of attention from the government?'

Conjunction:

92. **Хоть** доходили слухи, что Величко выздоравливал в госпитале, но вылечивали его не иначе как на убой.
[**ХОТЬ** arrive-p-pl rumors-N, that Velichko recover-p-s in hospital-L, but healing-p-pl he-A not otherwise as on slaughter-A]
'**Although** rumors reached us that Velichko was recovering in the hospital, but they were healing him only to prepare him for slaughter.'

93. Напугались и сами казахи, **хоть** были они слишком грозные для гостей, со своими жгущими даже на вид хлыстами.
[Got a fright-p-pl and oneselves-N Kazakhs-N, **ХОТЬ** they-N too much menacing-N for guests-G, with one's own-I stinging-A even on appearance-A whips.]
'And even the Kazakhs themselves got a fright, **although** they were overly menacing for the guests, with their whips, which sting just on sight.'

94. Скоро он не стерпел, **хоть** хотел казаться отдельным, и надрывно закричал.
[Soon he-N not endure-p-s, **ХОТЬ** want-p-s seem-infin detached-I, and hysterically begin to scream-p-s.]
'Soon he couldn't endure it, **although** he wanted to seem detached, and began screaming hysterically.'

95. Вариво пахло сдобой, **хоть** могло оказаться самым несъедобным на вкус.
[Concoction-N smell-p-s goodness-I, ХОТЬ be able-p-s turn out-infin most-I inedible-I on taste-A.]

‘The concoction smelled good, **although** it might have turned out completely inedible to the taste.’

96. Галина так и не поддалась Артему, **хоть** и близка была к тому раза три.
[Galina-N thus and not succumb-p-s Artyom, ХОТЬ and close-N be-p-s to it-D time-G three-A.]

‘And so Galina didn’t succumb to Artyom, **although** she was close to it a few times.’

97. **Хоть** и уверяют футболисты, что о деньгах они думают в последнюю очередь, фактор этот, особенно для российской команды, отнюдь немаловажный.
[ХОТЬ and assure-np-pl soccer players-N, that about money-L they-N think-np-pl in last-A line-A, factor-N that-N especially for Russian-G team-G, by no means not insignificant-N.]
‘And **much as** the soccer players assert that they think about money last of all, that factor, especially for the Russian team, is far from insignificant.’

98. **Хоть** он и уверяет, что был влюблен семнадцать раз, но мне кажется, что он никогда не любил и не может любить.
[ХОТЬ he-N and assure-np-s, that be-p-s in love-past-p-part seventeen-A times-G, but I-D seem-np-s, that he-N never not love-p-s and not be able-np-s love-infin.]
‘And **much as** he claims, that he’s been in love seventeen times, it seems to me, that he’s never loved and is unable to love.’

99. Нет, я не брезговала, **хоть** молодая была, и не так, а любила, честно, бабы, любила.
[No, I-N not strain-p-s, ХОТЬ young-N be-p-s, and not so, and love-p-s, honestly, women, love-p-s.]
‘No, I didn’t work at it, **although** I was young, and it’s not so, but I loved, honestly, ladies, loved.’

100. Но еще не вечер, **хоть** и позднится, даст Бог — пересечемся
[But still not evening-N, ХОТЬ and get-late-np-s, give-np-s – cross-paths-np-pl.]
‘But it isn’t yet evening, and **although** it’s getting late, God will grant that we cross paths.’

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